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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of tnis thesis is to analyze and evaluate
the many complications and ramifications arising from the
fundamental application of the principle of seniority with
respect to layoff, recall, promotion, and transfer. To date
no book has been written on trie subject in the field of labor
and Management relations to satisfy my interest. And While
many magazine articles deal with the seniority issue, not one
has treated it as I desired. This thesis is an analysis and
a criticism of the seniority principle rather than the
development of some new theory.
The primary sources are specialized with relation to
the particular problems as reported in trade journals. In
other secondary sources, books by Frederick K. Harblson,
Sumner H. Slichter, Lee H. Hill md Charles l. nook, Jr., et
al.
,
were exceedingly helpful for their viewpoints on the
seniority issue.
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CHAPTER I
SENIORITY IS A MAJOR ISfc JE IN MODERN INDUSTRY
Today the problem of seniority is a subject which is be-
coming increasingly important in the field of labor and manage-
ment relations. Many times it causes more grievances than even
demands for higher wages, shorter hours, and other working con-
(1)
ditions. The workingmen, especially the unskilled and the
semi-skilled, are motivated toward job security by the fear of
layoff, and they and their representatives of labor organiza-
tions are more concerned, than ever before in the selection of
employees for layoff, rehiring and promotions. ’’The question cf
)
security for the workingman combs at or close to the top of the
(2 )
list in his enumeration of life’s objectives' 1
.
Management is
experiencing many obstacles if it does not grant to the senior
employees complete recognition of their rights, one of which is
jthe principle of seniority. Often management adopts seniority
provisions in collective bargaining contracts without union
coercion, for seniority has important psychological affects.
And by assuring job security, the worker is no longer perturbed
about economic insecurity. His peace of mind is set at rest, hii
jenergy is renewed; these factors tend to increase his morale, hit
loyalty to the firm, and his efficiency.
nr Edward S. Cowdrick, "The Riddle of Employee Seniority’!
Nation’s Business .Vol. XXVII . No. 9, September ,1‘JZ j,p. hi
(2) George Ericson, "Interest Increases in Profit Sharing’^
Christian Science cnitor .Boston, ‘arch 9, 1946.
, 2|| J
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Insecurity has been a curse on mankind since the begin-
ing of the Industrial Revolution. Economic insecurity is
bearing down heavily on the lives of great masses of people in
the United States, who are thoroughly dependent upon wages for
their livelihood. "For freedom, liberty, the right to stake
a claim and say it is his, ... common man down through the
(2
centuries risked, gave up, or had taken from him his security’.'
In attaining a free status he jeopardized his security, an in-
dispensable need to his well-being and that of his family. The
economic value of lives became less secure with the advent of
the Industrial Revolution and its technological inventions and
improvements. "Until the introduction of the modern factory
system, economic relations between the employer and the employee
(4)
were direct and a more or less permanent character". The
master craftsman took a personal interest in the work of his
employees whose job was lifelong. The situation becomes compli-
cated today, because the worker does not know who his real boss
is, the manager, the president of the concern, or the stock-
holders
.
The modern worker is relieved from many physical risks
that he might have incurred in an earlier period, but he experi-
(5)
ences a high degree of economic insecurity. Collective bargain-
ing has at tern:- ted and has been somewhat successful in
(D) Clinton Golden and Harold j. Ruttenberp , The Dynamic;
of Industrial Democracy. u.ilU.
(A) Abraham Eistein, Insecurity : A Challenge to .merica, u,
(o) Lois UacDonald, Labor Problems and the American
Scene, P.18.
4
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recapturing for the industrial v/orxer that security which he
parted with as a result of industrialization. The desire for
m.re economic security has become a major issue today, because
the average worker has no control over his job. The ability to
have the essentials of life, of health, and of culture depends
almost entirely on the steadiness of his job. Workers, on the
whole, do not join a union for its ideological purpose, but
because the union can get then what they as individuals are
powerless to get for themselves. Therefore, one of the motives
for union membership is this desire for security.
The pattern of economic sec unity is related in part to
the continuity of employment. The prevailing wage structure has
made security depend upon the stability of the employees’ jobs.
The size of the incomes of industrial workers makes it almost
impossible for those with families to Sc.ve sufficiently to carry
them through long periods of unemployment. Seniority strives to
protect these older workers from layoff, based on the possible
discrimination by management. Because there was so much dis-
crimination and favoritism exercised against older employees in
making layoffs, it became necessary to adopt an unbiased and un-
prejudiced method. Restriction of layoff by seniority became an
organizing issue by unions, for it protected union members also
from possible displays of favoritism by management.
The seniority principle, as used in industrial relations,
is defined as the "preference in available employment
.i
,
<
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opportunities based upon length of service”. The right of
seniority is based on the theory that the greatest possible job
security, advancement, and other privileges should be considered
with satisfactory performance on the job. The seniority system
is not nev/. It is ”as old as the employee -employer r lationship
(V)
itself”. It is rather difficult to trace the origin of seniorit
' (8)
1
as a custom, because it has been "lost in antiquity”. But
seniority is an important factor in government Civil Service, in
Armies and Navies, in university faculties, in churches, in
financial institutions, and in the assignment of committee posts
in Congress.
The labor organizations of today have included the
seniority rule in collective bargaining contracts, but the rule
is not original with them. Our Army and Navy first practiced
the seniority principle in this country, but it was borrowed
from the English, who in turn adopted it from the ancient Roman
and Greek military practices. The foIlo? ring quotation is a
description of the British regiment at the time of the French
r
(G) Frederick H. Harbison, "Seniority in Mass-Production
Industries”. Journal of Political Economy .Vol .XLVII I , No. 6,
December , 1940, p.851.
(7) Alec H. Mowatt, "Seniority Provisions in Collective
Agreements”, Monthly Labor Review. Vol.XLVII. No. 6, December,
19558,, p.1250.
(&} Dan H. Mater. "Railroad Seniority System”, Journal
of Business of the University of Chicago. Vol. XIV, No. 1,
January, 1041, p. 68.

___
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and Indian War fought in this country from 1756-1765:
In a large force each battalion had its permanent position
determined by regimental seniority, in a fixed grouping into
brigades. Each brigade, similarly, had its normal place in
a fixed ’order’ of battle. (9)
It was during our Revolutionary War that the seniority
rule was adopted. It became necessary to establish some rule-
posting the colonies, as they considered themselves allies and
did not recognize a senior state. General Washington’s solution
was that the relative position of a state be decided in arrang-
ing the Line of the Army by troops of the different states who
were posted according to the relative geographical position of
the states to each other, supposing their front to be the ocean.
The precedence of the regiments with the line of each colony was
determined by the seniority of the colonels who commanded the
regiments when organized; the precedence of the regiments, once
(10 )
fixed, did not change with a change of commanders.
Several difficulties have presented themselves in deter-
mining the first seniority clauses in collective bargaining con-
tracts. Many early unions are no longer in existence, and of
the few that still survive, there is little record of any agree-
ments which- they might have had since the agreements were oral
(j) Oliver L. Spaulding, The United States in -ar and
Peace
, p.7, quoted in the article by Dan E . Eater, ’’Development
ahd Operation of the Railroad Seniority System", Journal of
Business of the University of Chicago . Vol. XIII, No. 4, October,
1940, p.591. '
(10) Ibid., p.51, Mr. Spaulding gives as his reference
"The Penn Archives", (Ed ser .Xl)pp.289,482,489. The quotation
is in the article by Dan H. Mater, "Development and Operation of
the Railroad Seniority System", Journal of Business of the
University of Chicago . Voi. XIII, No. 4, October, 1940, p .551.
..
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ones. The earliest inclusion of seniority in a written agreemen'
ras first found in the railroad agreement of the rctherhooc of
Locomotive Ingineers and the New York and Hudson Liver Railroad
(11) (1L)
in 1875. Archibald . clsasc, the author of Thf order of
Railroad Telegraphers
.
said that the seniority /rircf ie v as
probablv in effect on some roads before the first telegrapher T s
(IE)
schedules "ere establish^
. .
Z. Ripley ates that the
records of an investigation of the strike of 1877 by the engineers
on the Boston and Maine Railroad show that there existed a defi-
nite custom of laying off junior employees first when forces
were reduced. The earliest inclusion of the seniority rule in
non-railroad, collective bargaining agreements ras in the Hew
(_l4)
York Typographical Union No. 6 in 18 j0.
(TT5 Dan H. Mater, ’’Development and Operation of the
road .Seniority System", Journal of Business of the University of
Chicago , Voi . XIII, No. 4, October, 1940, p. 292
.
( Y2 ) Archibald 11. Ycls; The Order of Railroad Tele-
graphers
, p. 256, quoted in the article by Dan K. Mater, ’’Devel-
opment and Operation of the Railroad Seniority System”, Journal
of Business of the University of Chicago
.
Vol
. XIII, Yo. a.
October, 1940, p. 2 95.
(12) W.Z.Ripley, ’’Railway Schedules an< . ;reements”, A;, or
-
dix VI of the Report of the Eight Hour Commission, p. 5Q7. Mr.
Ripley gives as his reference the official report by the Massa-
chusetts Railroad Commission. The quotation is in the article bj
an H. Mater, ’’Development and Operation of the Railroad Seniority
System”, Journal of Business of the University of Chicago
.
Vol.
Kill, No. 4, October, 1940, p. 292.
(14) Dan H. Mater, "Development and Operation of the Rail-
road Seniority System”, Journal of Business of t. n Mn.Yv-.r; V
Chicago , Vol. XIII, No. 4, October, 1940, p. 292.
..
,
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The seniority system became a major issue amone shilled
workers on the railroads as far back as the late 1370’s
.
The
extensive development of the seniority rule on the railroads at
an earlier date than in other industries ' is due to ... variety of
factors. The employment tenure was broken up frequently by
transfers and layoffs, caused by the consolidation of the rail-
roads and technological Improvements in the equipment. .any of
the railroad owners, who were solely interested in o taining
quick and easy profits, know very little about t e management
and operation of the carriers. The supervisors, then had
almost free reign in the layoff procedure, and in the granting
of promotions according to merit and ability, and so "played
(15)
favorites". and. discriminated against union members in the
(16)
assignment of "runs", promotions, and in filling vacancies.
To overcome these complaints of favoritism and discrimination,
the railroad unions forced management to include in collective
bargaining contracts a seniority system by which layoffs and
promotions were made in accordance with clear-cut and well
defined, formulae based, on length of service. Unions were in a
strong position to control employment policies, because of the
strategic position of the railroads and their power to tie u
industry when the workers were on strike, causing greet losses
to the railroads and resulting in unemployment for the workers.
FredericK H. Harbison, "Seniority in hass-Productior
Industries", Journal of Political Economy
.
Vol.XLVIII, No. 6,
December, 1940, p.851.
(16) Morris L. Cooke and Philip; Murray, Organized h.„bor
and Production
,
p. 65.
..
The desire for protection of the older workers appeared to have
seen secondary at that time, although one of the negotiation
issues after the Gould Railway strike in March 1685 included the
seniority rule of giving preference to trie older men over the new
(17)
ones. Today most contracts between railroad management and labdtr
unions contain such strict seniority clauses covering both layoff
and promotions that neither management nor the employee can
influence job allocation.
In the printing trade which was also among the first to
urge recognition of seniority, "priority rights" were adopted
(18)
whenever labor organizations became well established
. In this
trade the adoption of the seniority system led to the reduction
of the number of itinerant craftsmen. .'ith the development of
simple mechanized processes, lengthy apprenticeship became less
important, and the worker was deprived of such security as arises
(19)
from a special skill which was an asset not easily replaced
.
"The growth of the mass production industries and the
increased union activities has made tue question of seniority ond
(l?) John R. Commons, History of Labour in the United
States . Vol. II, p. 868.
(18)
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Division of Industrial
Relations, "Seniority Provisions in Union agreements", Monthly
Labor Reviev.' .Vol. LIT, No. 5, ;Iay, 194.1, p. 1167.
(19)
Alec H. Mowatt, "Seniority Provisions in Collective
Agreements", Monthly Labor Review . Vol. XLII, No. 6, December,
1938, p. 1250.
*1
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of the dominant issues in industrial relations”. Since 'or Id
War I the emphasis of industry has been on youth with its speed,
endurance, and fortitude. This emphasis has been displacing
older employees at such an ever increasing rate that the unions
have demanded the adoption of the seniority system as a protec-
tion for older workers. Seasonal fluctuations in these indus-
tries mean frequent layoffs which increases the feeling of
insecurity in a great many jobs where semi-skilled and unskilled
employees can be easily replaced. The disregard for seniority
rights at the time of rehiring after a slack season is one of
the many grievances tormenting industry’s labor force for the
(21 )
past twenty-five years.
During the first quarter of the century, many employers
(22 )
accepted the seniority princi. le, but with some reservation.
Management often considered combined length of service and abili-
ty in the determination of layoffs and promotions and it was very
rarely the cause of a dispute. Nowadays, management often resent
and fears the administration of seniority as an infringement upor.
its prerogatives. Under collective bargaining practices, manage-
ment yields to the seniority system which protects the
o(20)
Alec H. Mowett, "Seniority Provisions in Collective
Agreements", Monthly Labor Review .Vol. XLVII, No. 6, December,
1938, p. 1250.
(21) Herbert Harris, American Labor , p. 274.
(22) Edward £. Cowdrick, "The Riddle of Employee
Seniority", Nation’s Business
.
Vol.XXVII, l'o. 9, September , 1 Pod,
P . 24
.
..
.
1C
individual’s right to work and safeguards the older employees
without endangering the success of the business. Many companies
adopt seniority as a means for reducing labor turnover and en-
couraging life-time service.
’’The depression years of the 1950 ’s turned the attention
of industrial workers from the search of opportunity t.q> a quest
(23)
{for security”. Curtailed production and technological changes
[brought about widespread unemployment in the manufacturing in-
dustries. ’’orkers were being laid off at random and in a biased
nanner. ’’Unemployment threatened to become chronic”, for there
(24)
• ”v/ere not jobs enough to go around”. Workers stopped changing
jobs. The old and the yuung endured many disadvantages. ’’The
aged became vociferous in their insistence upon economic security
(25)
whether through pensions or through job preferences”. Leaders
of labor unions pressed for the acceptance of seniority rules
which would provide job protection and security of employment.
Seniority rules are designed to give job priority to employees
of long service over others with fewer years of continuous ser-
vice provided they fulfill their requirements, anc to prevent
discriminatory discharges.
Before 1955 the seniority system had been used in the
(23) Frederick H. Harbison, ’’Seniority in Mass-Production
Industries”, Journal of Political Economy
.
Vol. XLVII, No. 6,
December , 1940, p. 351.
(24) Edward S. Cowdrick, ’’The Riddle of Employee Seniority
Nation’s Business. Vol. XXVII, No. 9, September ,1959, p. 24.
(25) Ibid., p. 24.
.*
c
c
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railroads, printing trade, and street and interiorban transporta-
(26)
tion; all ere unionized industries. In 1955 the Congress of
Industrial Organization organized non-union industries and
seniority rules gained recognition in the steel, oil, automobile,
glass, radio, rubber, textile, electrical, paper, and other manu-
facturing industries. Before the rubber industry was organizer,
layoffs, rehiring, and l&ansfer-s were entirely at the discretion
of management that rarely considered the superiority of long
(27)
service. ’’Layoffs were used as a form of intimidation”. The
demand for a seniority system was one of the organizing issues oi
the United Rubber Workers of America. ith the signing of the
union contracts between 1917 and 1958, seniority was the deter-
(26)
mining factors in layoffs, rehiring and transfers.
A stud3^ of about three hundred trade agreements negotiated
between 19a: : and 1929, showed that - only about one out of three
contained layoff restrictions, whereas an examination of a simi-
lar number of agreements signed between and 1950 revealed
(23)
tv.ro out of three provider, such restrictions. The Merchants
(26) Frederick H. Harbison, ’’Seniority in . ass-Production
Industries”, Journal of Political Economy ,Vol. XLVII. I o. 6.
December, 1940, p. 852.
(27) Philornena Warquardt and Sophia F. cDowell, ’’Senior ii*
in the ;,kron Rubber Industry”, Wonthly Labor Review
.
Vol. LIX.
No. 4, October, 1944, p. 788.
(28) Ibid., p. 789.
(29) Sumner H. Slichter, "Layoff Policy" in an address on
"Industrial Relations", 19t-j, Bureau of Industrial Relations,
University of Michigan, 1989, p. 74, quoted in a book by Pich&rd
A. Lester. Economics of Labor, o. 624.
y
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Association of New York requested S72 employers located in New
York City to furnish specified information concerning their ex-
periences in seniority practices. Seniority was taken into con-
sideration for making promotions by 109 employers out of the 119
employers who replied to that question, for increasing salaries
by 111 out of 120 employers, and for arranging transfers only 2'c
(SO)
out of 86 employers.
There are a few industries which, although organized, are
to be noted by their almost complete absence of the seniority
system in union agreements. Such industries are those of the
building, construction, and clothing fields which are highly
seasonal. Because a large part of the working force is affected
by slack work at one time, most unions prefer work-sharing to
layoffs. Seniority is sometimes used in special cases, where
there are large reductions in the working force, because of
technological changes.
In recent years the seniority system has become more im-
portant than ever before in American industry. The desire for
security is the fundamental thinking of the workingmen today, for
it grants to them the assurance that they will be able to main-
tain their prevailing standards of living without any change en-
dangering it. Middle aged and older workers are assured that a
seniority system is a protection against discrimination and bias
and that it also helps secure tneir positions from those employees
who may endeavor to gain favor from management officials. These
(SO ) "Seniority Practices in New York City”, i.Ianagement
Review , Vol. XXIX, No. S, August, 1940, pp. 284, 285.
..
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employees, according to Frederick H. Harbison, are the ones
who enjoy job security, and the burden of unemployment ir period'
of depression falls on the shoulders of those young employees
who have the shortest length of service. But it is only natural
for the older men to seek protection which seniority gives them.
It is only human for management to become impatient with the
complex seniority provisons in union contracts, but the signifi-
cance to the workers of attaining even a limited amount of job
security cannot be ignored by management without impairing its
industrial production.
It is to be noted that seniority provides some degree of
security for only those who are employed. It does not provide
security for the large mass of people for whom there are insuf-
(b<0
ficient work opportunities. The worker is still liable to
suffer from unemployment because of technological improvements,
which reduces the labor costs, and seasonal and cyclical layoffs.
One example of the many seniority proble.-s which confront
us today is the pronounced fear of insecurity in the postwar
period with the return of the veterans. The veteran must be re-
absorbed in industry, while the non-veteran worker is afraid of
being eased out of his job. The relations bet' een organized
labor and the veteran is heading toward a crucial point, because
of a new type of absolute veteran preference in employment known
(ol)Frederick H. Harbison, "Round Table in Collective
Bargaining and Job Security; Seniority Problems in Has s-Produc-
tion Industries", American Economic Review, Voi .XXX. in sup lemeni
larch, 1940, p.225.
(
r62) Clinton Golden and Harold J. Ruttenberg. The Dynamic j
of Industrial Democracy. d. 121
.
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as superseniority
.
The veteran counts his war service as the
time worked for his former employer, and he can displace workers
without regard for their length of service. The Selective
Training and Service Act guarantees veterans "absolute priority"
(so)
on previous positions regardless of seniority. The ex-service-
man is entitled to his old job or one with like status, pay and
seniority. In this way the veteran who had been employed, for
about one year, before entering the service, could displace a
worker with twenty years of seniority, if due to lack of work
all employees with less than twenty years of seniority had. been
laid off. This procedure violates the basic union principle of
seniority. The Kirstein Leather Company in Peabody, .Massachu-
setts faced a shut -don Ootuber 51, 1945 as one hundred and
seventy-five employees protested against the employment of a Y/ar
vet-, ran at a different job than he had when he entered the
service of the United States. The Company was paying the veter-
an the same wages he received previously, but his seniority rati
" (34)
has been endangered by the shift in jobs. The union is not
willing to concede the veteran superseniority. It would grant
the veteran his olo job in accordance with seniority provisions
contracts. Management is also concerned about the veteran’s
superseniority. It has argued that "it might handicap the re-
conversion by placing relatively inexperienced men into key
(35)
positions
.
(be) "Veteran ’ s Job Showdown"
,
Bus ine s s eek Jo. ShO
.
.
' ay
13, 1345, p. 100.
(54) Bost hi Globe, November 1, 1045.
(55) "Veteran's Job Showdown"
,
Business ~eek
.
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Seniority was proposed as a sincere interpretation of th^
Selective Service Act. The "onion and the government were both
anxious to help the veteran. But the interpretation of the Se-
lective Service Act (referred to above) has aroused deep resent-*
(36 )
ment and fear among organized labor. The union is fully aware
that it must protect the rights of its members but also avoid aijiy
action which might create anti-union sentiment among the veter-
ans
.
General B. Hershey, Director of Selective S ervice,
claims that a veteran does not have to join the union in the
plant regardless of what national labor laws may say about the
(57 )
right of a union to maintain the closed shop. He also said
that the courts are divided on the extent of a veteran’s right
to his old job. Judge Matthew T. Abruzzo ruled that for one
year after returning to the old job, the veteran cannot be laid
(38)
off or discharged while such jobs are available. Two other
courts decided n that the veteran was not entitled to continuous
work following reinstatement if his seniority placed him in a
(59 )
position where he ordinarily would have been laid off”. The as-
sertion of the veteran’s immunity to layoff for one year, and hi
exemption from union membership is a danger to the union’s secur
ity. S eniority rights are tied up with collective bargaining,
and job security for all depends on these rights. Unions are
(36) Jack Schuyler, "Veterans and Union Rules 1 ' .American
Mercury .Vol.LXI, No. 264, December
,
1945, p.666.
(37) Ibid, p.666.
(38) Ibid, p.666.
(39") Christian Science Monitor .Boston. February 20.1946.

16
fearful that the Selective Service Act may prove destructive to
one of the most valuable rights of the workers, After one year
of immunity, the veteran does not have much security, a;.d if the:
uniDN is weakened, neither does the non-veteran. The veteran's
accumulation of seniority under the union contracts would
increase his job security. Most unions protected the rights of
its members in the Armed Forces, preserved their union member-
ship and other benefits. They won ware contracts in which wages
(40)
and promotions of the absent veterans were protected. The
Selective Service Act, while demanding that employees be re-
hired in positions of "like seniority" does not make it plain
whether seniority is to accumulate during the period of military
(41)
service or is to be frozen on induction into the service. In
September 1942, the Bureau of Labor Statistics warned that a
controversy of major proportions would threaten the ambiguity
(4S
surrounding the seniority of employees entitled to reinstatement,
Labor, management, and the veteran’s organizations agree that
Congress rephrase the law so that the meaning will be clear.
"An essential element to making any seniority system work-
able seems to be a friendly, cooperative relationship between tne
(4*0 ) Jack Schuyler, "Veterans and Union Rules", American
Mercury
.
Vol.LXI, No. 264, December, 1945, p.o70.
(41) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
,
p.374.
(42) "Controversy Ahead Over Draftees Returning After
War", Labor Relations Reporter
,
Vol. XI, No. 3, September 21,
1942, p.64.
c
17
parties to" agree by means of a compromise which, will give
the worker confidence that length of service will be accorded
the proper consideration. The Johnson Sperry Company settled
the problem of the veteran by giving William T. Maquire eignt
thousand dollars (*6030), the largest amount he had received
before entering the Navy, in place of his return to a prewar
(44)
job. The Company could not afford for the sake of good
business to discharge the man who had replaced him during the
war. Donald C. Miller, Federal District Attorney, said he
thougnt this ease was one of tne first of its type. This
would be a step in tne right direction if industry could
afford to give some remuneration to the returning serviceman
in place of his former job. It would not be a final solution,
but it may be a part of one.
(43 ) Frederick H. Harbison, " Seniority Policies and Pro-
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bargaining "
.
p. 63
.
(44) Christian Science Monitor, February 15, 1945.
.
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CHAPTER II
TYPES OF SENIORITY
One of the problems in the ap , lication of a seniority
program is the determination of the "area upon which seniority
(1)
rights shall be based". Seniority may be ap lied by length of
service in occupations, departments, divisions, plants, or
companies. Sometimes only one type of area exists, at other
times there may be a combination of types. A temporary layoff
may be based on departmental seniority, where the employees with
the least seniority of a given department are laid off first,
but longer layoff may be in accordance with plant seniority.
That is, employees laid off on a departmental basis are sometime
granted the right to displace other employees with les~ seniorit
in other departments of the plant. Often layoff may follow one
type of seniority and recall another. Recall or rehire means
that the senior employee, who was the last one to be laic off, i
the first one to be reemployed. Layoff is often based on one
seniority unit while promotion, the advancement of a senior
worker with the ability to perform the work to a position of
increased responsibility, is based on another unit.
The important factors in determining the range of
(1) Bureau of Labor Statistics, Division of Industrial
Relations. "Seniority Provisions in Union agreements". I onthly
Labor Review. Vol. LII. No. 5. lay. 1941. d . 1163.
>
T
*
..
.
seniority are the size of the plant, the diversity of operations
and the number and variety of operations. If one department of
plant works on various products, layoff in that department may
differ in time and intensity from layoffs in other departments.
The type of plant organization limits the extent to which em-
ployees with seniority may displace those with little or no
seniority in the reduction of the working force.
In recent years many controversies have arisen over the
basic type of seniority and no type is satisfactory to managemen
cw
or to the majority of the -workers. Strict seniority is as both-
ersome to some union leaders as it is to some managements.
"Unions endeavor to obtain the widest seniority in order to give
(£)'
the greatest protection to their employees", for limitations on
seniority rights might deprive long service workers of emy loy-
ment opportunities. But too broad a unit encourages displace-
ment and movement among the workers of which management does
not approve.
The most successfully operating seniority clauses make
provision for the accu ulation of seniority on a broad
basis, i.e., plant-wide or department-wide, but in recog-
nition of logical job families, set ui smaller seniority
groupings fur purposes of promotion and lay-off within
the general framework. (4)
>
as a rule the seniority system works most effectively
and with a minimum of confusion in those plants 'here all the
(n) Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrie!
: h-iiagemerit
. p . 140.
(a) Jack L. alters, Personnel Relations; Their he iica -
tion in a femocrac
. p. 55.
(4) Research Institute of America, Labor Kelc tions
:
Policy and Practice
, p . 710k
.

employees folio”'’ the same craft or occupational grouA s within
which jobs are of a similar nature an/ non-iutercliangeable
.
"Because of the similarity of v;ork, occupational fitness may be
determined with relative ease and precision, and there is little
(5)
movement of ' ,rorxers from one craft or occupation to anotner "
.
Seniority by crafts works well when groups of highly skilled
employees are set apart from the main working force, and are or-
ganized by craft unions separate from the main force. The prob-
lem of pleasing different craft groups within a single union is
minimized, since unionism developed along craft and not along
industrial lines.
In the transportation industries, such as the railroad,
( 6 )
seniority is usually applied by craft or classification. In the
railroad shops, machinists, boilermakers, and other groups have
seniority rights at their particular craft jobs generally only
(7)
at the "point" or shop where they are reemployed. hen posi-
tions are abolished long service employees may exercise their
seniority to displace men with less service credits. This prac-
tice known as bumping is carried on until the worker with the
least seniority is furloughed. Promotion is made on the basis
of divisional seniority from one classification to another, as
in the train service from an apprentice to a brakeman . Cl .ssifi -
cation has worked quite well on the railroads.
(b) Frederick H. Harbison, "Seniority in . kiss -Production
Industries", Journal of Political Lconomy.Vol .LlVIIl
. .0.6,
December, 1940, p.856.
(6) Frederick E. Harbison, Seniority Policies and roce -
c w . . 3 evelo Through Collective l,v -uln , ] . 17.
(7) Ibid
.
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"The broadest seniority division is between production
work, on the one hand, and the skilled-trades group" comprising
such occupations as tool and die makers, and construction and
( 8 )
maintenance men. Don-interchangeable occupational groups consist
of a specific number of occupations closely related in skill.
These jobs are interchangeable as to one another, but not to oc-
cupations in non-interchangeabie groups. Non-interchangeable oc
cupational groups may extend to a department, a division, or a
plant, depending on the type of work and its relation to the pro-
ductive process. In the following clauses, seniority is recog-
nized within a complete industrial division: "Straight occupa-
tional seniority shall be applied in the i/iechanical Division".
(9)
(Packard Motor Co. and United automobile ' iorkers-CIO) . in the
agreement between the General Motors Corporation and the United
Automobile Workers on June 24, 1940, seniority shall be applied
by non-interchangeable occupational groups, within the depart-
ments or plant-wide as may be negotiated locally except that
"when changes in methods, products, or policies would require
the permanent laying off of employees, the seniority of the dis-
placed employees shall become -plant-wide and they shall be trans-
ferred out of the group in line with their seniority, to work
( 10 )
they are capable of doing".
(8) Jonas Silver and Everett Id. Kassalow, "Seniority in
the Automobile Industry", Monthly Labor Review . Vol . LIX , I: p . s
.
September, 194<±, p.465.
(9) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
,
p. 491.
(10) Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial
, Management
.
p.142.
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_
..
'
.
--
• •
•
.
.
.
The union aims to widen the non-interchangeable occupa-
tional group to include occupations of related skills. A broad
non-interchangeable group, management claims, results in unwc r-
ranted job displacements in the course of layoffs. uften a fur-
loughed worker is recalled, to his regular department in his own
non-interchangeable occupation group. But since the occupations
within a unit are arranged in order of progression, he may have
to resume work in a lower classification, vlhen production of thje
plant is expanded, he moves up to the job he left.
In industrial plants where there is a great variety of op-
erations, the concern is divided into departments. Only the
workers doing the same type of work in the industrial process are
considered to be in competition when jobs are refilled and pro-
motions made. In the following clause department seniority pre-
A
vails
:
An employee will have a separate seniority-standing in
each department in which he has worked. His seniority in
each department will equal the length of service in that de-l
partment plus the length of previous service with the com- - \
pany, dating from his first day of employment by the company;" '
"This form of seniority limits the workers to be consider-
( 12 )
ed to those most likely to be fitted for the jobs involved".
Often one department may be working, while employees in
other departments have to be laid off, because of lc,.ck of work.
(11) Bureau of L abor Statistics, Division of Industrial
Relations, "Seniority Provisions in Union Agreements". Monthly
Labor Review . Vol. LI I, No. 5, May, 19A1, p.1172.
(12) Alec H, Mowatt, "Seniority Provisions in Collective
Agreements',’ monthly Labor Revie?/
.
Vol. XLVII, No. 6, December, 19SG,
p . 1252
.
*
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flany times the short service employees remain on the job, &nd
the long service workers are without employment. In such cases,
Dumping is allowed, that is the displacement of employees with
less service credits by senior employees. Some agreements permit
the laid off employees to exercise their seniority in a depart-
ment, in which they have formerly worked or in those jobs which
they have previously held, to displace an employee with less
seniority in that department. Bumping is possible within an
area of jobs which are largely interchangeable. In the folio 1 ’injE
clause employees about to be laid off can claim seniority in
different departments:
If any employee is about to be laid off in any department,
he may claim any seniority he has in any classification in
any other department and shall take his place in such classi-
fication on the basis of his seniority in that department,
but, if there are no employees in any classification in any
other department with less departmental seniority, he may
then claim a job in the yard on the basis of plant senior ity,
and, if he does so, the Yard employee with the le^st A lant-
seniority will be laid off. (Texas Company and Oil orkers
International Union-CIO)
.
(15)
Some agreements do not allow the displacement of junior
employees except in the department in hich an employee is work-
ing at the time. In a clause of the Texas Company and the Oil
'orkers International Union (CIO) contract, bumping takes place
only by transfer to a lower intrc -departmental classification
(14)
regardless of departmental seniority. Departmental s eniority
operates again after such displacement has occurred
.
(lo) Bureau of National affairs. Collective Be rgaining
Contracts
,
p . £5 7
.
(14) Ibid., p. 557.
.*
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*
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In very large departments v/here there is such a diversity
of jobs and skills, seniority may be ap^ lied by occupational
groups. In a clause from a collective bargaining contract be-
tween the 'ashougal Woolen hills and the Textile ' 'orkers Union
(CIO), separate seniority lists are necessary for the different
work classifications within a given department, and the trans-
ferred employees retain the seniority which they have accuired
* (15)
on any job. If layoff occurs, workers on any group may use
their seniority to displace employees in lower sub groups.
Those that are furloughed in one specific group may not exercise
their seniority if other groups are of comparable status. This
limited application of seniority frees management from excessive
movement of the v/orkers, and efficiency is thereby maintained.
Also the workers who are retained are qualified by experience to
perform the available work. But this restriction of the seniori
district lessens the over-all protection of the workers which
seniority should give them.
If there is a variety cf operations, straight de± artmenta
seniority applies to employees who are qualified to perform the
available work. It limits the application of seniority to a
specific department, for the shortest service workers in any de-
partment are the first ones to be furloughed regardless of the
jobs or occupations. The older employees who are retained
transfer from job to job within the department.
(15) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts , . 49i.
'7
,
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Departmental seniority is most effectively applied in
plants where the jobs requiring similar skill and experience ar<
included in a s ingle • department and where various occupational
groups do not cut across the department line. Wiiere there is
little interchange of employees between the departments, the
problem is minimized if curtailed production results in about
the same proportion of layoffs in various departments. If such
conditions do not exist, long service workers may be laid off
in one department while short service workers are retained in
the others. But if these conditions do prevail, one short ser-
vice workers are the ones to bear the brunt of layoffs. The de-
partmental seniority causes much dissatisfaction among the
v. orker s
,
for work falls down in one department and not in another.
"A plant or a division is a unit of an industrial organ-
ization within which there are usually several different depart"
(13.)
merits'.' Often times there is little difference between plant
and department seniority, for in mass production industries,
some departments are larger than some plants. Plant-wied senior-
ity is relatively easy to . administer in the simplest type of
operation. It commonly prevails in small factories where jobs
are specialized and somewhat interchangeable* Che unions ' or
this type of seniority unit, for it allows for the maximum se-
curity to long service workers. Preference in layoff and reem-
ployment is based on total service credits, without regard for
the department or occupation which is being curtailed. In the
(Id) Frederick H. Harbison, seniority Policies i-ro-
cedures as Developed through Collective Bargaining
,
p.23.
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following clause the length of service in the plant determines
the seniority status: "Seniority will be determined by length oj
service in the plant as a whole". (Monsanto Chemical Company and
(17)
Chemical orkers Federal Labor Union-nFL)
. In a clause in the
contract between the California 1 'ire Cloth Company and the Steel
Yorkers Organizing Committee (May 1989) in case of layoffs, the
last employee laid off is the first to be rehired, until the
(18)
list of former employees is exhausted.
Plant-wide seniority frequently results in "bumping".
'then & worker finds his job no longer available and if he is
qualified for another job, he may displace a worker with less
seniority. This procedure continues until the employee with
the least plant seniority is furloughed. One layoff may result
in a greater number of displacements, causing much discontent
among the men. Also management has been considerably incon-
venienced. The Goodyear Rubber Company provides for a broad
seniority unit where a qualified employee may displace another
worker with less seniority anywhere in the plant.
The order of displacement in the event of a layoff is
stipulated as follows: (a) to operations, or operations
listed as like operations in other departments; (b) to other
operations in other departments for which the transferee T s
previous satisfactory experience gained at any time while
(17) Eureau of Rational Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
. p . 490
.
(18) FredericK H. Harbison, Seniority Policies and Pro -
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bargaining, p . 24
.
£.
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in the employ of the company; (c) to short learning period,
operations for which he can qualify. (19)
The agreement between George A. Hormel and the United.
Packinghouse '.Yorkers (CIO) specifically prohibits displacements
of short service workers by bumping. The laid off employee, if
transferred, must take open jobs:
When work in any department slacks down to the point
where it is necessary to transfer people to other depart-
ments, the youngest in plant seniority shell be transferred
They must take open jobs in other departments or gangs and
fill in where they are needed. Under no circumstances
shall there be bumping of any kind. Under no conditions can
a worker who has a regular job be "bumped off" from that
job, regardless of the amount of seniority someone else
may have. (20)
A plant-wide seniority system must consider the workers r
qualifications of skill and ability on the various jobs. Very
often collective bargaining agreements state that an employee
may exercise plant seniority to claim the job of another worker
with less seniority, if he has performed that job previously, or
if after a short training period he is competent to tackle that
job. This type of seniority is very impractical in plants where
having replaced a worker with less seniority, the senior employ
requires an extended training period. In large plants, promo-
tions based on plant-wide seniority is also impractical, for the
worker with the most service credits may know little about the
job in 'which the vacancy occurs. Some contracts contain the
"(19) Philomena Marquardt and Sophia F. McPowell, "Senior
t'y in the Akron Rubber Industry", Monthly Labor Revie' .Vol.LIX
No. 4, October, 1944, p.791.
(2CF Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
.
p.558.
y
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proviso that the employee must be given an opportunity to demon-
strate his skill in that particular job. A few employers have
realized that when this proviso is practiced, the union demands
that even the poorly qualified be transferred to the available
jobs. The results of too much bumping are serious disorders in
the plant, such as inconvenience, inefficiency, and dissatisfac-
tion for the workers as well as for management. For this reason
management wants to limit the seniority district to avoid excess
sive movement. Also in a small seniority unit it is eas ier to
determine the ability and efficiency of the employees.
Some understanding between the company and union should
be reached concerning the prerequisite qualifications before laj
offs occur. One company and the union settled the problem by re
viewing the entire working staff in order to determine what jobs
each employee had performed and in which positions he was able
to perform without training. A rating was made 'when the working
force was fairly stable. lien layoffs did. occur, this rating
was used and all the discussion of qualifications was consider-
(21 )
ably reduced. Seniority "rating groups" consider related
jobs and allow free transfers between the jobs within the plant-
(as)
wide seniority system. A rating group is a combination of
operations or jobs which are so similar in nature, that the lay-
off of any employees from the group will not seriously interfere
(21) Frederick H. Harbison, Seniority Policies and Pro -
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bargaining
, p. 25.
(22) Research Institute of America, Labor delations ;
Policy Practic e, p.7102.
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with the production. The worker who may be laic off in his
rating group has the privilege of transferring to another group
subject to the following conditions: if he has satisfactorily
performed another job in another rating group within his rating
unit (a rating unit is a combination of the rating groups within
which an employee’s versatility is ascertained), he shall have
the right to transfer to such group providi g any employee in
this group has a seniority rating lower than his.
In many plants skilled workers, such as machinists, are
exempt from plant seniority and placed in special seniority
classifications. 'Then plant-wide seniority" is applied by" occu-
pational groups, a definition of the occupational grou; is usu-
ally made after carefully analyzing the ability- required for the
specific work, 'hen plant seniority is ap lied by such groups,
it closely/ resembles the craft or classification seniority used
(s5)
by the railroads.
Plant-wide seniority has many benefits. Its ' ide range
assures job security to the employees iith long service credits.
It makes interdepartmental transfers easier to administer. The
employee has the chance and the incentive to qualify'- for a vari-
ety of jobs. By having a smaller, but permanent working staff
with a variety of skills, the employer might be able to main-
tain steady employment conditions. Plant-wide seniority func-
tions well in small units -here many of the occupations are
clearly defined. Often skila and ability must be considered
(2c) Frederick H. Harbison, Seniority Policies a.nd Pro -
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bargaining.
.
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in limiting the application of plant-wide seniority.
The main objection to plant-wide seniority is that it
results in too many displacements or "bumping TT . Because of this
practice no worker knows 'there he stands, for he r1 oes not know
who may be able to displace him. Sometimes one layoff causes a
number of transfers which naturally dissatisfies management and
the workers. The amount of changes depends for the most part on
the effectiveness of the ability and efficiency clause in the
collective bargaining contract. Unless the qualifications for
the different jobs are defined exactly, the efficiency of the
working force is apt to be 'weakened
.
"Technological and market changes . . . may make the
seniority districts in mass-production industries very unstable’.1
'"hen technological changes result in the permanent elimination
of departments, occupational groups, or jobs, the straight
seniority principle is likely to become more flexible in such
cases where the improvements in the process, the methods and the
equipment occur. In these instances, seniority becomes plant-
wide for the long service employees. The probability of tech-
nological changes in one part of the plant may cause the employes
in another to demand a straight seniority rule to protect them
from the other workers
.
They may try to form "seniority walls"
around themselves to keep out the employees with long service
(25)
record
.
(24) Frederick H. Harbison, "Seniority in hass-Production
Industries", Journal of Political Economy
.
Vol. XLVIII, No. 6,
December, 1 j40, p. 855.
(25) Ibid ., p. 857.

Because of the difficulty that technological changes bring about,
such as the impossibility of finding sufficient work for the dis-
placed workers with plant seniority, some collective barge ining
contracts provide that the transfers of such displaced, workers be
a matter of joint union and management negotiation.
Some industrial establishments prefer to apply the seniority
principle to divisions. This is a broader unit than the depart-
ment. At the B. F. Goodrich Company, a five (o) year man has
divisional seniority rather than departmental. To avoid layoff
ne can displace an employee in some other division who has the
least company service, providing the latter has less than five
(26)
years of company service. In the rubber industry there is the
tendency for a general similarity of jobs on a divisional basis
and less similarity on a plant basis.
Under a company-wide type of seniority the st; tus of each
worker equals the total of his recognized service with the corn-
>
pany. Transferring from one job to another within the company
does not effect a worker ! s seniority standing. Unions are in
favor of this unit of seniority, for it gives the long service
workers the maximum of job security. The following clause pro-
vides for the determination of seniority with the company at all
present and future plants on this basis:
The seniority herein provided for shall be on a Company-
wide basis, applicable to the Long Island City plants, to
(h8) Philomena Marquardt and Sophia F. McDowell,
"Seniority in the Akron Rubber Industry", ionthly Labor Review.
Vol. LIX, No. 4, October, 1944, p. 791.
. . .?
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the Newark plant, and to such plants as the Company may
hereinafter operate. (Brewster Aeronautical Company and
United Automobile Uorkers-CIO) (27)
If a company, which has several plants, curtails produc-
tion because of a depression, it is generally assumed that lay-
offs in each plant will be made independent of layoffs in other'
plants. Some agreements specifically say that long service men
will not be permitted to displace shorter service men in the
(28)
3
other. This is quite a different situation from- the correspond-
ing results of the permanent shutting down of a department in one
of several plants. For in that case, the employees in the de-
partment which is being closed feel that they have a claim on
the basis of seniority in the other departments.
There are few collective bargaining contracts which pro-
vide specifically for department-wide or plant-wide seniority
(29)
system. And to adjust some of the disadvantages of their strict
seniority application, the union and management have agreed on
various plans merging the two types of seniority. Employees may
be promoted and transferred in accordance with their department
seniority, but in the event of layoff, the long service workers
will be furloughed with plant seniority, after the temporary
employees have been laid off (they have no seniority rights),
and the short service workers have been laid off on the basis
ft
(27) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective--- Bargaining
Contracts
.
p.490.
(2S) Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and In< ustrial
Management
. p . 141
.
(29) Frederick H. Harbison, Seniority Policies and Pro-
cedvxes rs Developed Through Collective rk.rguinir
, ;
.
p . 2 8
.
.
( n)
of department-wide seniority. Since the right to displc.ee a
junior employee is restricted to jobs for which he can qualify,
there is little discussion as to a long training
x
:erioo
,
and
there is practically no loss of efficiency. The problem which
does present itself is when the long service workers are not abl
5
to perform the regular work. If they should be transferred to a
simpler job, will they accept the existing wage rate for that
job, or will they demand a wage rate in accordc.nce with their
long service record, and '"ill the demand be granted?
another combination ’ rhich works fairly well is to lay off
employees in accordance with their seniority in their particular
department and to re hire them for the jobs they are capable of
(cl)
performing in any department on the basis of seniority. By this
method layoffs result in very little loss of efficiency. The
long service furloughed employees are granted greater preference
for reemployment when the working force is increasec in any part
of the plant.
'"hen seniority is of primary consideration in advancement,
it is usually applied by classification or department-wide
seniority in skilled jobs and on plant-wide basis for un-skilled
(32 )
jobs. All new employees hired for unskilled work, c-.fter being
qualified by sufficient training, are gradually promoted to more
skilled occupations. If promotions from one classification to
(bo) Frederick H. Harbison, Seniority Policies and rro-
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bargaining,
x .
£6.
(31) Ibid., p. 28.
(32) Ibid., p. 29.
'!: / .
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another are based on departmental seniority, the employee may be
advanced rather speedily, if he mad a long service record in the
department. Under classification seniority, the employee will
W probably remain for a longer period of time in a single occupa-
tion, but he gains a more complete training. Carefully organizer
promotions, demotions, an nsequent layoffs may e made withouf
loss of efficiency. An employee is demoted to a less skilled
job on which he has had training. This method combines the
merits of departmental and plant-wide seniority, for the skilled
workers are laid off by departments, and plant-wide seniority
applies to the unskilled employees who usually h ve the minimum
of training. Management objects to this system, for lengtn of
service is applied not only to layoff and reemployment, but also
to promotions, demotions, and transfers.
The rigidity of the lines of promotions and the virtual
impossibility of employing new workers in any part of the
plant except when operations are expanding may result in
stagnation and consequent impairment of the working force. (3« )
Since the principle of seniority is one of the most per-
sonal or ra tiler human factors in industrial relations, each in-
dustrial establishment has to work out and formulate its own
seniority system to satisfy management as well as the workers.
There are so many variations of combinations of she types of
seniority
,
that management and labor should devise a seniority
program .\hicn would meet the requirements of all concerned.
»
_
(33) Frederick H. Harbison, Seniority Folicies and Pro -
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bargaining
,
p.32.
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»CHAPTER III
THE ACQUISITION AND LOSE OF SENIORITY
Usually an employee commences to acquire length of
service credits from the hiring date or, if not put to work im-
mediately, upon his assignment to a job. In the case of Astern
Air Express Corporation and the International Air Line Pilots
Association (Ind.) ’’seniority shall begin to accrue from the
date a pilot is first assigned to air line duty and shall con-
( 1 )
tinue to accrue during such period of duty”. Some agreements
require that new employees prove their ability to perform the
duties of a job before receiving the protection of seniority.
In such cases the employee must serve a probationary period, the
length of which varies from sixty (60) days to one (l) year.
Under the following clause employees hired for the first time
are regarded as prob t ionary workers and are required to work
three months before accumulating length of service credits:
New employees not previously in the employ shaj.1 be
considered probationists for a period of three months, and
shall not accumulate seniority until the end of that ^ro-
bationary period. (Hubbard aid Company and St < ] ork v:
Organizing Committee-CIO) (2)
A great number of jobs in the rubber industry necessitates
a trial period of less the n three weeks, and while seniority
(1) Bureau of .ational Affairs, Collective bargaining
Contro cts
, p. 43-..
(2) Ibid., p. 4:90.
..
.
.>
>
is qualified by "ability to do the job" a learning period is
(-)
generally permitted, it the conclusion of the probationary
period, the employee is given credit on the service record for
ail the time ’forked. His name is then added to the seniority
list which is posted or given to the union.
All employees rill be considered on t temporary or trial
basis for the first weeks of their employment. If re-
tained c.fter the trial period an employee becomes a member
of the regular working force with full seniority status.
Seniority status, once acquired, dates from the time of
hiring. (4)
In the intervening period of time, the employee may be given
some designation indicating that he has no claim to job opportu-
nities based on his length of service. Union membership is oc-
casionally necessary for seniority standing.
During the probation period the em loyer is usually free
to discharge new workers without limitation by seniority rules.
If the worker is retained after his probationary period, he is
assumed to hc.ve demonstrated competence as a worker and is
entitled to seniority protection.
The seniority provisions for apprentices in collective
bargaining contracts differ considerably from those applying to
the other employees. As an apprentice, he rarely has seniority
(b) Philomena Marquardt and Sophia. F. IcDowell, "Seriorit
in the Akron Rubber Industry”, ' onthly Labor Revie:, Vol. LIU,
No. 4, October, 1044, p. 789.
(4) Bureau of Labor Statistics, Division of Industrial
Relations
.
"Seniority Provisions in Union .-.greements" , onthly
Labor Review, No. 5, lay, 1941, p. 1169.
T
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status. If he does not receive any seniority credit after the
completion of his apprenticeship course, his employment with the
firm might be terminated. But some clauses provide that at the
end of his course his service credits may be calculated from the
day he was hired.
All indentured trade apprentices shall be exempt from the
seniority provisions of this agreement. Tae hiring and lay-
off of graduate and cooperative student apprentices shall be
within the discretion of the Company, An apprentice at the
completion of his contract shall have seniority in any group
in which he ho.s worked, based upon his Company length of
service. The designation of such group shall be at the
discretion of the Company. (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. and
United Automobile Workers -CIO)
.
(5)
In this instance the apprentice might be tble to replace
a worker with several years of experience who in all roi: ability
hell ed train him. Because there is the possibility of this
occurring, some unions alio - each two (...) years of app renticeshi
to equal one (l) year of seniority as a orker.
Once seniority is obtained, an employee may lose his
seniority st tus for a variety of reasons, such as voluntary
resignation from his concern, discharge for just cause (a breach
of discipline or a violation of a company rule), failure to
report to accept employment after layoff when notified of the
availability of work, acceptance of permanent employment else-
where, failure to return within a stipulated period after expire
tion of leaye of absence, excessive absenteeism, and after pro-
longed layofi
. Collective bargaining contracts usually limit th
employers’ right to discharge workers in two ways. There are s
:
.e
Bureau of National Affairs,
Contracts
,
p . 110
.
if led
C ollective Bargaining
.,
.f
c
reasons for which an employee may be oiscnargec, such as Incom-
petence, drunkenness, dishonesty, and disobedience to t..e rules
of the company. Also the employee may be granted a period of
notice, before actual dismissal. Some agreements provide for
payment in plc.ee of notice, while others are paid with or withou
a period of notice. Under the following clause, an employee
loses his seniority rights, if he resigns or is discharged: "An
emoloye who is released cr "discharged loses all seniority".
( 6 )
"Celanese Corj-. of America and Textile Tcrkers Union-CIG) This
unusual proviso appears in the agreement between S. F. Bailey,
Inc. and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners (AFL)
:
"Any employee being laid off for non-payment of cues in Local
Union No. 1876 loses his seniority after two (2) months layoff
( 7 )
and is no longer considered an employee of this Company". The
following is a sound clause for the thirty (50) day proviso
remedies resignations and discharges which were mistakes:
An employee shall lose his seniority rights, and shall
break his continuous service record, (i) if the employee
quits or is discharged, except when rehired 'ithin 50 days.
(2) If hen summoned to report for work, the employee fails
to report for three consecutive days without giving a reason
for such failure which is satisfactory to management, (a) If
the employee is absent from work for three consecutive days
without notifying the Company and giving a reason for such
absence which is satisfactory to management. (4.) If tx.e em-
ployee has not worked for the company for a perioc of one
year. (8)
(6) Bureau of National affairs. Collective Bargaining
Contracts
. p . 494
.
(7) Ibid., p. 494
(8) Lee H. Hill and Charles R. Kook, Jr., management at
the Bargaining Table
, p. 1J5.
e.
.
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The following clause provides for the loss of seniority if the
worker accepts employment elsewhere while on le^ve of absence:
Employees shall be granted limited, legitimate le<ve of
absence (in writing) for good c^use, 'with consent of the
Company and the Bargaining Committee without prejudice to
seniority cr other rights. Employment elsewhere during such
leave of absence shall automatically cancel any seniority
of other rights. (Bendix aviation Corporation and United
Automobile ’/orkers-CIO) (3)
There is wide variation among agreements by which senior
i
is retained or terminated during layoff. One of the main pur-
poses of the seniority system is to insure the laid off workers
preference in reemployment when plant operations resume. Often
times one year is the maximum period of layoff during which an
employee retains his seniority status.
An employee laid, off in this department for lack of work
shall go on the surplus labor list, -where length of service
in the plant shall determine seniority, but if such employee
does not work for the Employer for a period of one (i) year
he shall no longer be considered an employee and shall not
retain any seniority rights. (E. J. Heinz Company an
Canning and Pickle Workers -AFL) (10)
.
Very often agreements stipulate a two (2) year period of layoff
to break seniority standing. "when an employee is laid off
through no fault of his own, his seniority shall terminate only
after he is laid off two years”
.
(Hubbard P Comp an
,
and Steel
,
dp
’ orkers Organizing Comraittee-CIO)
. In a few instances workers
with a long record of service retain their seniority status
for even longer layoff periods, for once having attained long
(9) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts, p. 496.
(10) Ibid., p. 496.
(11) Ibid., p. 496.
..
.
.
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service credits, it is fitting thc,t such men be given preference
in reemployment.
Senior workers with five or more years service who ere
laid off during severe depressions may be exenr ted from gen-
eral provisions governing loss of seniority and remain
available in accordance with earned seniority. (12)
In some cases the union may be forced by its members to
favor the loss of seniority after a short layoff period. For if
durin the period of slack production the work is to be shared
only by the employees with the greatest length of service, then
they are interested in limiting the size of the seniority list.
An agreement between the Beering Aircraft Company and the Inter-
national Association of Machinists (AFL) provides for the rein-
statement of senioritv rights, once lost, if the employee is re-
(15)
hired and continues to work for five years. In such cases he
will be credited with his previous seniority.
As a general rule agreements provide that seniority shall
not be terminated as a result of properly arranged leaves of ab-
sence for union business, illness, accidents, military service,
and layoffs of not more than a stated duration. A leave of ab-
sence is mainly to preserve the benefits the worker has, such as
seniority. Seniority may be lost if permission to leave is not
secured
.
Any employee desiring a leave of absence from the job
(12) Eureau of Labor Statistics, Division of Industrial
Relations, "Seniority Provisions in Union Agreements", Aonthly
Labor Reviev;
.
Vol. LII, No. 5, May, 1941, p.1170.
(15) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contrac ts
. p. 497.
..
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shall secure written permission from both the Union and the
Employer. Failure to comply with this provision shall re-
sult in the complete loss of seniority rights of the employe^
involved. Inability to work because of proven sickness or
injury shall not result in the loss of seniority rights.
(Over-tne-Road Motor Freight and International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers-AFL) (14)
Employees are commonly allowed leaves of absence to at-
tend union conventions or to perform other union duties, and em-
ployees elected to fulltime union duties occasionally maintain
their seniority status in case they should wish to return to
their jobs. Men having plant experience will be more apt to
hold union positions if their seniority is secure. If seniority
is net preserved, they will not volunteer for such jobs. Young
-
(15)
er and less responsible men will be compelled to take them.
The important considerations in granting leaves of absence ere
the length of the leaves and the determination of • hether or not
seniority accumulates during such times. Most unions believe
that when an employee is granted a leave of absence to hol( uni<|n
office or on account of sickness or injury, he should continue
to accumulate seniority, just as if he had been working in the
plant. S ome company officials feel that such a practice is not)
fair to those workers who have remained on the job and that the
employee on leave of absence should retain his seniority only as|
of the date on which he left employment. Under the contract be
tween Porcelain Products, Inc., and the Federation of Flat Glasd
(14) Bureau of National affairs. Collective Bargaining
Contracts
.
p.B5£.
(15) Lee H. Hill and Charles R. Hook, Jr., Management at
the Bargaining Table
, p. 46.

.'orkers (April 191/9), seniority roes not accumulate for employee;
who ere on leave of absence serving ^.s full-time officers of ti e
Union. Seniority resumes if and Then such employees return to
(16)
txie service of the Company. The agreement between the New York
Shipbuilding Corporation and the Industrial Union of Karine and
Shipbuilding Yorkers (CIO) grants union officials up to two (a)
years’ leave of absence for union business and. rovices for
(17)
cumulative seniority during such le-ave.
Although many contracts provide for no aoss of seniority
in the case of sickness or of injury, some do place limitation
on the retention of seniority status:
Any man qualified, and employed by the Coni].any v ho on ac-
count. of disability for reasons of ill health, accident, or
other similar causes is un bie to pursue his regular daties
shall, on application, at the commencement of such disability
be given a leave of absence for the period of his disability
due to such causes ithout loss of his seniority rights.
(Diamond Motor Car Company and Automotive 'orkers Industrial
Union-Ind.) (18)
/my employee who is known to be ill, sup orted by satis-
factory evidence, will be granted sick-le; ve automatically
for not to exceed 90 days. If the illness extends beyond 90
days, the sick-leave may be extended, net to exceed a total of
one year, on approval of the general manager of the division
or his designated representative
.
Employees with seniority
will accumulate seniority during such period. (General Koto:'
Corporation and United Automobile '’orkers, June, 1940)
.
(19)
(16) FredericK H. Harbison, Seniority Policies and Pro-
cedures as Developed. Through Collective Barta-inin
. . 7
.
(17) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
. p. c5 7.
(18) Ibid., p. 8.
(19) Frederick H. hlrbison, seniority Polici.c and Pro -
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bar.a ani.. •
.
. 7.
'.
.
Upon entering military Service, an employee does not lose
his seniority under the Selective Service act.
'hen employees are called upon to serve in any capacity
for the United States Government, during a war, upon their
return they shall be reemployed at vorK generally similar
to that they did just prior to their leave provided they
are physically capable, and with no loss of seniority.
(Packard otor Car Corporation and United Automobile .rorkers
Se,:t mber, 19o9) (hQ)
The following agreement considers the time spent in military
service as continuous employment with seniority accumulating
during such service:
If any employee is called to serve the Armed Forces of
this country the time lost due to such service shall be con-
sidered as continuous service with the Company
,
so far as
seniority is concerned. (Hubbard h Company anc Steel
'Yorkers Organizing Committee-CIO) (hi)
The agreement of the . I. DuPont 1 € Nemours & Company and the
United Mine 'Yorkers, District 50, (CIO) permits seniority to ac-
cumulate for servicemen up to the maximum of fourteen (14) months
In another agreement between the Texas Company and the Oil
v
'orkers International Union, seniority accumulated
,
but a provis
restricts the accumulation to prevent reemployed veterans from
displacing an employee who had a higher rating at the time the
(ho)
ex-serviceman left. A higher rated, employee who had been laid
off in the interim would, be protected.
(20) Frederick K. Harbison, Seniority oiicies and Pro -
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bargaining
. p . 7
.
(hi) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective1 Bargaining
Contracts
. p. 574.
(22) Ibid., p. 575.
(y£) Ibid., p. 576.
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..
.
.
.
.
.
44
.
To many workers seniority has become synonymous with the
job itself. This is revealed in the reluctance of many workers
to give up their seniority on less essential jobs for generally
more remunerative war work. To induce workers to shift to de-
fense jobs in the early stages of the defense program, the 0 ffice
of Production Management found it necessary to recommend to man-
agement and labor that seniority rights to their old jobs be
(24)
protected
.
(24) Philomena Marquardt and Sophia F. K cDowell, ” Seni-
ority in the Akron Rubber Industry”, Monthly Labor Review
.
Vol. LIX, No. 4, October, 1944, p.792.
.. ,
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CHAPTER IV
LAYOFF AND RECALL
The principle of seniority as applied to layoff and re-
employment has become well rooted in American industry. L ayoff
is most frequently used in connection with dismissal from a job
because of lack of work. Sometimes though, it is used with ref-
erence to temporary suspension for disciplinary reasons without
permanent discharge. The seniority principle is important, for
it considers that the worker with the greatest length of service,
who is capable of performing the job, be retained during the pe-
riod of the reduction in forces, in preference to another worker
who is equally competent to perform the work but has fewer years
of continuous service. And this same employee is to be rehired
aftur the layoff in order of his seniority.
The s eniority principle as applied to layoffs requires
generally that layoffs be made on the basis of strict seniority,
and those workers who have the least seniority are laid off
first. Seniority rights, it is to be noted, do not interfere wi|
the employers’ right to discharge inefficient workmen. An ex-
ample of simple seniority, where the l&st man hired is the first
to be laid off, is as follows: nThe accepted rules of seniority
shall apply to layoffs; the last man hired shall be the first
man laid off.” (Shadbalt and Boyd Company and Retail Clerks
«
i
.
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(i)
Protective a ssociation and Office oners Union-eFL)
.
Straight
seniority rules are sometimes influenced by consideration of
other factors, such as ability, merit, efficiency, family status,
place of residence, age, and citizenship.
"whether expressed in agreements or implied by understand -
ings, seniority is always applied with some reference to skill
(2)
and ability". In some agreements seniority is given considera-
tion only if skill and ability are relatively equal.
It is understood and agreed that employees shall be laid
off and rehired in accordance , rith their seniority rating
and their skill and ability, but whenever, between two or
more men, skill and ability are fairly equal, seniority
shall be the controlling factor. (Xing Powder Co. and United
line workers, District 50-CI0)
.
(a)
In the following clause, ability supersedes seniority in the
selection of employees to be laid off:
The employer and the Union agree that seniority shall
prevail in the shop in the event of layoffs from slack
seasons, or business reasons, and in rehiring of same
employees laid off. However, ability shall supersede
seniority .ying to same or the promotion of employ* . .
(Gateway Baking Company and Confectionery Workers-AFL)
.
(4)
Tiile many agreements contE in no specific provision on
how ability will be determined, some do name management as the
sole judge, while others provide for the approval of both partie .
;
(1) Bureau of He tional Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
, p . Zc5.
(2) Frederic:: H. Harbison, Seniority l-olici-.s : nd Pro -
cedures as Pevelo ed Through Collective Be.rgaining
. p. be.
(o) Bureau of Kational ..ffairs. Collective Bargaining
Centre cts
. p
.
Ue 6
.
(4) Ibid., p. CoS.
<
*3
.
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to the agreement. The unions often object thct skill and ability
are subjective factors which cannot be always judged impartially.
ome employers have adopted detailed plans for rating personnel
efficiency, but these plans do not completely remove the employee
.'ear of bias. Pressure is likely to be brought on management if
.t ignores seniority and retains junior employees who are not out
Standingly superior to the employees who have been laid off. It
.s dangerous to lay off a long service man and keep a short
service worker who is not much better, 'lien seniority is over-
looked, the length of service credits should not be of such a
great difference that a worker's sense of equity be abused. Such
factors as skill and ability are often given more consideration
(5 )
in a higher rated job than in an unskilled job. This is dis-
:rimination against the unskilled man who may be as capable in
his job as a skilled worker in his.
In a small number of agreements employees' place of resi-
dence, citizenship, family status, number of dependents, or
>ther social factors are introduced to modify the application of
strict seniority in layoff. In some c^ses these factors are
:onsidered when length of service and ability are relatively
qual. Then seniority becomes so limited by other considera-
tions, it has very little practical ef ect.
Sometimes seniority is modified in its application to
.ayoff by permitting management to retain those key workers who
(5 ) Frederick ii. Earbis 01 , Seniority Policies ana Pro-
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bargaining
. } . cd.

( ,
are "indispensable” because of a specialized exceptional skill.
Employers are usually limited to a number of exempted employees
by a specified percentage of the working force or by a certain
type of job.
Exceptional employees are employees whose work, in the
judgment of the Company, is of exceptional value to the Com-
pany and whose length of service with the Company is three
years or more. The number of exceptional employees shall
not exceed five per cent of the total number of employees
on seniority lists covered by this agreement. (Allis-Chal-
mers Ilanufacturing Company and United Automobile ' orkers-
CIO)
.
(7)
In a large auto plant it was recognized that specially
trained workers who could perform several different jobs were
needed at the start of production in set-up work and in the in-
(8 )
struction of other employees. Occasionally a union reserves
the right to also exempt from layoff certain employees whose
need for work is particularly great.
Union officials are appar.ntly in favor of a special list
as long as they can exercise some degree of control over the
number of exempted employees and the method of selection. In
practice many companies have never tried to retain exempted work-
ers without regard for seniority, because employees with special
skills have sufficient length of service to enable them to hold
v.
( 9 )
their jobs.
(6) Florence Peterson, American Labor Union . p.i08
(7) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
,
p.338.
(8) Frederick fi. Harbison, Seniority Policies and Pro-
cedures as Developed Throwh Collective Bargaining
, p.36.
(9)
Ibid., p. 36
-. Jf, o
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The inclusion of exemption clauses is a recognition by-
labor that management needs to be alerted for the encouragement
and development of workingmen of exceptional ability.
Another modification of strict seniority in layoffs is
the exemption of members of union grievance committees, shop.
stewards, and local union officers who ere placed at the top of
their respective seniority lists.
All members of the shop committees and shop ste arcs
shall be accorded top seniority in their departments, alien
a layoff occurs, for the dure tion of their term in such
capacities and at the end of their term they shall return
to their previous status. (Castena Paper Co. and Unitec
dine Workers, District 50-CIO)
.
(10)
.
This clause gives the chief steward top seniority in the depart-
ment and the district steward top seniority in the district:
"Chief Stewards have the most seniority in their respective de-
partment; district stewards will have the most seniority ii
their respective district ... U (Packard dotor Car Co. nd
,
cm
United automobile orkers-CIQ) Where emj loyment fluctuates
sharply, this modification is of much importance to the union
and to management in the preservation of the continuity of the
bargaining procedure and of the grievance adjustment personnel,
and is a defense against discrimination. It also reduces the
turnover of union representatives who may become more reasonable
and responsible the longer they serve.
(10) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
, p. 559.
(11) Ibid., p. 272.
»
*
Before the National Labor Relations Board a^ _ roved of
union membership for foremen and supervisory orkers, management
was confronted with the problem of whether or not supervisors
retained or lost their seniority standing on being promoted to
such positions. Some managements protected the seniority of
their supervisory staffs and granted to them seniority superior
to that of the production employees, even if reduced forces
resulted in supervisors being put back on machines . For the
employees best suited for supervisory jobs may have refused them
if there was the possibility of losing their seniority, and if
they might be subject to layoff when they returned to production
work. The following clause protected these supervisory employees:
Employees who are not covered by this agreement and who
are classed as supervisory or management employees and who
are transferred to jobs covered by the agreement solely
because of temporary lack of need of their services in their
regular jobs shall have seniority over all employees on such
seniority lists. (l£)
Some employers felt that management should have the unqualified
right to retain foremen on production jobs even if regular
(IS)
workers were displaced. Since ’’foremen are labor” now,
unions cannot argue that foremen should not be allowed to take
the available work away from the working force. If supervisors
were laid off instead of being demoted, longest service mer
might lose their jobs because of the original promotion from
the assembly line.
(in) Lee H. Kill and Charles R. Hook, Jr., hnagenent It
the Bargaining T<>ble
. p. 131.
(la) Christian Science Monitor
.
Boston, .arch B, 1-J< '
.
..
.
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Probationary employees do not have any seniority rights.
Management has the right to layoff or discharge the probationary
worker, but at the end of his trial period he is usually credit-
ed with accumulated seniority from the beginning of his employ-
ment. In case of layoffs, probationary employees are usually
the first to be laid off. They are laid off first in their re-
spective departments where the working forces are to be reduced,
and then they are laid off throughout the plant, with the proviso
that there are available employees with seniority who are capable
and willing to do the work of the probationary employees laid
off
.
Collective bargaining contracts usually make special pro-
vision for apprentices. They are laid off in accordance with the
seniority in their craft and in accordance with the predetermined
ratio to regular employees. "When reducing forces, apprentices
shall be laid off according to seniority in their craft, to main-
tain a ratio of one to ten.” (B. F. Goodrich Company and United
(14)
Rubber orkers-CIO)
.
Most collective bargaining agreements permit laid ofi em-
ployees the right to retain their seniority during an unemploy-
ment period: "Lay-off shall not affect seniority standing.”
(Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company and Glass, Ceramic and Silica
(15)
Sand ''orkers-CIO)
.
In the agreement of the B. F. Goodrich Company and the
(14) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts, p.110.
(15) Ibid., p. 559.
..
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United Rubber Workers (CIO) long service workers o.re allowed to
retain their seniority for three (c) years if they are laid off,
provided they conform to certain regulations, such as register-
ing in person on the specified form at the employment bureau
during the thirteenth and twenty-fifth months of layoff, and be-
(16)
ing rehired before the end of the thirty-six month of layoff.
Under an agreement between the Texas Company and the Oil "orkers
International Union (CIO), if employees are laid off for more
than one hundred and eighty days, they lose all seniority rights
In connection ,rith the loss of seniority as a result of
prolonged layoff, there is the possibility of a controversy.
Management prefers that seniority rights terminate after a layofjf
period of six months to one year. The seniority list is apt to
be reduced in a depression. The employers want to be free to re^
hire workers as they are needed on the basis of skill and effi-
ciency, instead of length of service. But the desire of the
worker is naturally to protect his seniority rights when laid
off. Most union officers insist that seniority be maintained
irrespective of the length of the layoff period. Union official^
in mass production industries have pointed out that many workers
normally employed by the company may be laid off for a period of
one (l) to three (o) years during a severe depression and. that
the termination of seniority after six months or one year re-
sults in an unjust loss of seniority rights, especially where
17)
(16) Bureau of National Pffairs. Collective Bargaining
Contracts
. p. 559.
(17) Ibid., p. £40.
/C-
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the industries &re subject to seasonc 1 and cyclica l riuctu;- -
(18)
tions. Once seniority is lost -workers can secure reemyloyment
only in competition ..ith other applicants, and union leaders
fe c r thc.t management may discriminate against union members end
older workers hen rehiring. Lose employers do rehire former
employees before hiring new workers.
Seniority is sometimes accumulated and is sometimes
frozen as of the date on which the employees are laid off. hen
the seniority date is determined from the latest date of hiring,
seniority may be allowed to accumulate during periods of layoff
so long as the employee remains on the seniority list. It is
common to provide that an employee shall be taken off of the
seniority list, after he has been laid off for a period of six
months, although longer and shorter periods are also found in
agreements. One contract provides that while seniority shall
accumulate during leaves of absence, including military leaves
(19)
of absence, it should not accumulate during layoff periods.
Seniority cannot guarantee employment; it is only c means
of distributing the available work opportunities. Although
seniority is widely used, it is not always well adapted to the
highly seasonal industries, such as the needle trace and the
(HO)
boots and shoe industries. Here there are established rul<
~
—(W Frederick H. Harbison, senior ity Polici .. - re -
cecur s as Developed Through Col-uective -argaining
.
.
c
.
(19) Let H. Hill and Cl s R. ] ook, Jr . . Mai ent t
the Bargaining Table
, p. lib.
(20) Twentieth Century Fund, How Collective Bargaining
"
rorks
. p. 20
.
..
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for shortening hours and dividing the available work among the
entire force. This practice permits the maintenance of a com-
plete staff, the elimination of the necessity for the distribu-
tion of work, and the recall of former employees when the work
picks up. The principle of work sharing has its roots in union
tradition and philosophy as well as in the particular economic
conditions of industry. Some union officials feel that senior it/-
gives preference to one group of workers at the expense of an-
other and that work sharing emphasizes cooperation for the good
of all union members.
Under a work sharing plan, those employees with short
length of service receive some income during the slack season.
During long periods of unemployment, equal division of work may
reduce the income of all employees to a low level. Some agree-
ments have combined layoffs on the basis of seniority with the
work sharing plans.
During slack periods available work shall be divided
among regular employees to prevent layoffs, if layoffs
cannot be prevented the last person hired in any particu-
lar department ehall be the first to be laid off. (21)
Such plans provide that the work be divided to a certain point
before the junior employees are laid off. Work may be divided
to a given number of days or hours per week, before the seniori-
ty principle is applied, i.e. shop craft unions on the railroads.
Most rubber plants provide for the reduction of the work week
before layoffs are made. If further layoffs become necessary,
(2l) Bureau of L abor Statistics, Division of Industrial
Relations, "Seniority Provisions in Union Agreements", 'onthly
Labor Review . Vol. LIT, No. 5, May, 1341, p.I175.
'*
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the employees arc removed from the departments on the basis of
(28)
seniority.
"lien seniority governs layoffs, rehiring employees is in
the reverse order of layoff, and the employee with the greatest
seniority among those furloughed is the first one to be rein-
s tat eo
.
Upon an increase in the Corporation’s operations after a
layoff, employees on the seniority list of their department
shall be recalled to work in the order in which their names
appear on the seniority list. (Hartford Rayon Corporation
and Textile rorkers of America-CIO) (25)
The same qualifications of ability, skill, and other factors,
such as family status, age, and citizenship, which modified
strict seniority in layoffs affect recall. The saving of excep-
tional employees from the operation of seniority clc.uses in lay-
offs is important also when it comes to rehiring. Under the
agreement between Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company and the
United Automobile Workers (CIO) seniority may be neglected to
(24)
allow the hiring of employees with exceptional ability. The
Briggs Manufacturing Company and the United automobile orkers
(CIO) agreed that almost immediate rehiring be ensured to long
(25)
s ervice employees who have been furloughed. Often detailed
(22) Philomena Marquardt and Sophia F. McDowell "Seniority
in the Akron Rubber Industry”, Monthly L abor Review . Vol. LIX
No. 4, October, 1944, p. 790.
(25) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
. p. a66.
(24) Ibid., p. 467.
(25) Ibid.., p. 46S
.
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rules ere required in receiling employees efter e period o-
layoff in some agreements, such as to report to work forty-eight
to seventy-two hours efter receiving notification to return.
The reemployment of furloughed, workers in the order of
seniority is apt to increase the labor reserve connected v;ith en
industry. Men who have claims to jobs when work increases, ere
not likely to move a ay and look for other work. Many laid off
railroad shopmen remained idle in twenty-two (id) shop towns in
1 Ja'7 rather than take advantage of the shortage of metal
(26)
workers in an auto center.
Strict adherence to the seniority rule in layoffs is ob-
jectionable, for it not only removes from the most skilled
worker the job preference to which he is entitled, but it also
removes from management the right to retain the most skilled and
competent employees and to recall them after the period of lay-
off. It prevents the employer from laying off the least effi-
cient worker in the first lull of business, which procedure is
the principal method used for stimulating efficiency. The
average age of the employees is steadily increasing, for very
few young men can equal the seniority rating of the older men.
Rigid seniority rules Cc..n stifle the ambition of the junior em-
ployees, because they are usually the first to be laid off.
The main ambition of workers with dependents will tend
to become not progress in their cr, fts, not the opportunity
(26) Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies c.nc Industrie!
Management
. p. 15c.
.'
.
.
:
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to show what they can do in t better job, but the acquisi-
tion of seniority - simply a form of time-serving. (27)
A strict seniority system, however, could be adv< ntc.geous
for the employer would exercise greater care in the selection of
men. That would tend to promote better employment practices.
Union restriction in layoff prevents some workers from trying to
receive special attention from the foremen. Strict seniority
rules also preserve the efficiency of the less competent workers
by preventing concentration of layoffs among them, for a high
rate of turnover v/ithin a small group injures efficiency. A
seniority system reduces the operating cost in the discharge
of a great many employees. ith some reservations, seniority
(28)
is a sound principle. It is not perfect, but it is the best
suggestion that has been presented in preserving the orkers
’
job security.
(27) Harold F. Browne, "Second Thoughts on Seniority
Provisions", from a Conference Board Service Letter, September
aO, 1958, p. 69:4, ianagement Review . Vol. XXVI, No. 11,
November, 1958, p. 574.
(28) Ibid., p. 574.
a.
.
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CHAPTER V
PROMOTIONS, TRANSFERS, AND OTHER USES OF SENIORITY
The principle of seniority is applied not only to layoff
and recall, but also to promotions, transfers, hours of v;ork,
wage rates, and vacations. All require attention to their many
problems
.
A sound administration of a personnel program is to give
an employee within a concern an opportunity to improve his eco-
nomic status by increasing his responsibility in an advanced po-
sition. Continuous employment in one job becomes tedious, even
to a conscientious worker. A promotion policy is necessary, for
it permits the maintenance of mobility of the working force and
the recognition of exceptional ability. Employees are of the
opinion that advancement has a stabilizing effect, thus prevent-
ing a high labor turnover. There are many disputes concerning
advancement. ”A common cause of grievances is the allegation
that favoritism determines whether or not a worker T s status
a)
should be improved”. Another contention is that employers dis-
criminate against qualified employees, because of their union
membership, which statement if proved to be a valid one, is a
violation of the National L abor Relations Act. (The Wagner Act).
The union is persistent in its demands for the observance
nr Research Institute of America, Labor Relations; Polic
and. Practice
, p. 7121.
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of seniority us a basis for promotion. Th^t means that the old-
est employee in each position is given preference whenever
opportunities for advancement arise.
Promotions to all vacancies and new positions created
during this agreement will be made from the group of present
employees on the basis of (plant
,
departmental) seniority,
provided the employee is qualified. (U)
In other cases, while seniority is of main importance, other
factors are often considered.
In filling vacancies or making promotions, other quali-
fications being equal, seniority shall prevail. The word,
"qualifications" as used in this section shall include such
matters as experience, physical fitness, loyalty, skill,
knowledge, adaptability, efficiency, responsibility, integ-
rity and the like. ('Boston Consolidated Gas Company and
United line Workers, District 50-CIG)
.
(a)
And many agreements which contain straight seniority ap_ lication
in layoff and reemployment do not recognize an employes 1 s lengtl
of service to be of primary consideration when promotions are
made. Merit and ability are of main significance in such
contracts, which will be discussed later.
Many collective bargaining contracts contain the provisioi
that the senior employee will be promoted if he demonstrates
sufficient ability in a trial period for the higher job.
’ rhen new jobs are created or vacancies occur in the
respective crafts, the oldest employee in point of service,
shall, if sufficient ability is sho”n by trial, be given
preference in filling such new jobs or any vacancies that
may be desirable to them. (New York, Chicago, w St. Louis
(2) Bureau of Labor Statistics, Division of Industrial
Relations, "Seniority Provisions in Union Agreements”, Monthly
Labor Review, Vol. LI I, No. 5. May, 1941, o. 1177.
(o) Bureau of National Affairs. Collective Bargaining
Contracts, p. 498.
..
.
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Railroad Company and System Fed. No. 57, Railways Employees
Dept., A.F. of L. - June 1935). (4)
If the employee should be lacking ability for the higher job, he
may be returned to his former job without the loss of seniority
He should not be discharged for incompetency if he fails in the
job to which he is advanced, for he may be very capable and
valuable to the firm in his former job.
To guarantee the employee with the greatest length of
service credits first choice in the opportunity for promotion
within his particular working group, the union often demands
that the position be offered to the qualified senior employee,
before the notice of the vacancy is posted; The cluuse of the
Brewster Aeronautical Corporation and the United Automobile
'Workers (CIO-11/3/43) makes it emphatic that the employer offer
opportunity for promotion to senior employees in the section
(5)
before seeking new employees to fill the position. This type of
provision usually states that the employer will consider all ap-
plicants on the basis of ability and seniority. The opportunity
for promotions rather than the actual promotion is here given on
the basis of seniority:
Copilots may be given an opportunity to qualify as first
or reserve pilots at any time provided that such opportuni-
ties are given in accordance with their seniority. All pro-
motions to the status of reserve or first pilot shall be in
(4) Frederick PI. Harbison. Seniority Policies and Pro-
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bargaining, p. 34.
(5) Research Institute of America, Labor Relations:
policy and Practice, p. 7131.
'• -
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the order of their seniority-**-*-.
• rrhen a copilot fails to qualify for promotion as a first
or reserve pilot in his proper turn in accordance with sys-
tem of seniority, he shall be given two additional opportu-
nities to so qualify and such two opportunities shall be
given at approximately ninety-day intervals*-*-*. ( estern Air
Express C orporation and International air Line Pilots
Association-AFL)
. ( 6 ) .
Very often efficiency and merit are included in the pro-
motion policy along with seniority, come times seniority and
merit are given equal consideration in arranging promotions. At
other times seniority determines preference if ability and effi-
ciency are relatively equal.
In the advancement of employees to higher paid jobs when
ability, merit, and capacity are equal, employees with the
longest seniority will be given preference*-*--*. (General Motor
Corporation and United Automobile Workers -CIO 10/19/42) (7).
r
Here seniority is of' secondary importance. The Pulp Makers and
the Weyerhaeuser Company safeguard both seniority rights and
efficiency.
Seniority rights of workers are recognized, men with
longest term of service being given first preference for
both work and promotion, but in the latter instance manage-
ment has the final decision. (S)
The union usually avoids disputes with management over any se-
nior employee who is unqualified for the vacancy in question.
The employees and managements of oil companies became in-
terested in the application of seniority and merit when they
(o)Bureau of National Affairs .Collective Bargaining
Contracts, p. 497.
(7) Research Institute of America. Labor Relations:
Policy and Practice, p. 7121.
(8) James Meyers, Do You Know Labor? p. 112.
3
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realized the necessity of preserving an efficient and competent
(9 )
working force. The security of the employees will be sacrificed
if merit and ability are the sole governing factors, and, if
seniority is the only determining factor, initiative and effi-
ciency will be destroyed. A sound promotional policy requires
that these factors of merit, seniority, and efficiency be con-
sidered
.
A difficult problem, however, is that of determining the
relative SKill and ability of employees working on similar jobs.
There is no definite objective method for measurement. But in a
few industries qualifying examinations have been used. The em-
ployee’s qualities are periodically rated by those familiar with
the work. It is not a single judgment, but rather a v series of
ratings (seniority is usually included) made over a period of
(10)
years
.
"'here some agreements say that management should determine
ability, the union is not, as a rule, satisfied, for they regard
management’s choice of ability as favoritism. Some agreements
have worked out well where ability was determined by joint com-
mittees of management and the union. Professor Sumner H. Slich-
(id
ter of Harvard University has stated that the best arrangemenl
(9)
Donald. K. Livingston. ’’Merit and Seniority”. Personnel
Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 1, May. 1940, p. 9.
(10) Sumner H. Slichter. Union Policies and Industrial
M anagement, p. 146.
(11) Ibid., p. 146.
i
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for determining ability and efficiency was to let management make
any decisions subject to challenge by the union and to review in
the event of a challenge. ' liere the union and management maintaj
good industrial relations, the union is frequently content to
leave the determination of merit promotions to managerial dis-
cretion.
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent
the Company from promoting employees of particular merit or
those deserving promotion and who are promoted during the
term of this Agreement, provided there she. 11 be no discrim-
inatory transfers*--*-*
.
(Ciba Pharmaceutical Products, Inc
.
and
Pharmaceutical & Drug Workers’ Union-AFL-5/1/43) (12)
Some managements regard the procedure in promotions as
their prerogative. Most employers feel that promotions should be
^iven to the best qualified worker regardless of his seniority,
rhey believe that the determination of ability is a managerial
function which may not be subject to criticism by employees or
their representatives
.
Because of the great importance of skill
md ability in the advancement of employees, many employers re-
fuse to apply the seniority principle to promotions. "An em-
ployee may not use his seniority to claim a higher skilled job
:han his regular occupation”. (Thompson Products , Inc . and auto-
(13)
notive & Aircraft Porkers Alliance, Inc .-1938) . Most union
Leaders try to procure the most rigid seniority rules possible
in contracts, because they fear discrimination and favoritism
(l<0 Research Institute of America. Labor Relations;
3olicy and P ractice. p. 7121.
(13) Frederick H. Harbison. Seniority Policies and Pro-
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bargaining, p. 14.
n
..
.
.
6 '
.
from management . an} ertq I03 ers have recog Lzed the fact that
ignoring seniority in making promotions has made discrimination
possible and has left the employees with a low morale hich c iso
tends to lower efficiency. The workers feel t strong sense of
injustice, if a newcomer is promoted out of turn, feme employ-
ers have worked out plans with the union which consider seniorit r
along with other factors, for the seniority clone makes efficicn ;
operation practically impossible.
The Company recognizes that length of service should be
given important consideration in advancing employee s to
better paying work and ill continue its general practice
of giving it such ccnsi< r< ion in all cases of advancement.
Therefore, whenever the qualifications of t o or more
employees under consider, tion by it for such advancement, are
relatively equal in its opinion, it will make such advance-
ment on such a b<-sis. (14)
Most employers have the right to promote those orkers
who possess exceptional skill and ability regardless of sen-
iority. The union, as a rule, has rarely objected to this
exemption when the basis of the exemption is clear.
"Especially in the . « ki " of promotions to management
posi' ions is it important to r< tain full discretion ithin nan-
( 15 )
i • ent control"
.
;.ince the ability to supervise is uncommon,
management can best decide what employee is most cabbie to carr r
out the policies and practices of management. Before - forem *
had the right to join e union, he might have lost or retained
(14) Lee H. Hill and Charles R*. Hook, hr
. ,
",.rm genent at
the m rgr. ini • T, bie
. .
lie
.
(15) Ibid., p. 189.
•.
.
•
.
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his seniority credits, upon uis promotion to a supervisory posi-
tion. If he lost his service credits, he probable left the com-
pany, if he was returned to the assembly line during a slack
period and thus, subject to layoff. If seniority was retained,
the union no doubt felt that he represented management rather
than the workers. In the following clause seniority was not con'
sidered: "In the Management's selection of supervisors, senior-
ity provisions may not apply’.' (Union Oil O 0mpany and Oil Workers
(16)
International Union-CJO) Some unions desired to freeze the
seniority status of the workers who were promoted to a super-
visor's position as of the date of the promotion. This reserved
to the supervisor his right to his former job just in case his
supervisor's job was eliminated. Since foremen are now part of
the labor force, it is difficult to foretell just what repercus-
sions will occur. The unions may want to determine the promot ioifis
of foremen, which may result in the loss of anotner management
prerogative
.
The application of strict seniority in the advancement of
workers to a higher position is subject to much criticism. It
may cause ambitious junior employees to look for employment
elsewhere, for under the seniority system progress for these
young men is too slow. It interferes with the promotion of s^ort
service workers with a potential capacity for leadership. The
older employees in length of service take away job opportunities
(16) Eureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
.
p.5Q3.
. V
10
.
•
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from the young workers. The senior worker is often not the most
capable worker. Some of these employees may be efficient in one
type of a job, and may be less competent in a superior position
than someone with less length of service.
The union, on the ocher hand, maintains that seniority
rules should be rigidly applied in order to be free from the
workers’ charges of discrimination and favoritism. "It is high-
ly important for every worker to feel that he has a fair chance
(17)
for promotion if he deserves it". A worker wants the opportu-
nity to try for a position and to get it if he proves capable.
Because the workers are naturally against favoritism or discrim-
ination, they have to depend on the collective bargaining con-
tracts to protect and safeguard their rights.
No particular problems of seniority are involved when
( 16 )
transfers are effectec within a depart lent. But transfers to a
different department require considerable attention. A transfer
is defined as a job shift from one department or division to an-
other, where there is a vacancy or a need for additional workers
(1
without a marked increase in duties, responsibilities , or skill.
Sometimes layoffs in a plant may be concentrated in one or two
departments while the remaining departments operate normally.
(17) Thomas R. Carskadon, "Workers and Besses are Human:
Collective Bargaining at Work”, Public Affairs Pamphlet , no. 76,
194a, p. 17.
(13) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
.
p. 499.
(19) Rale Yoder, Personnel and Labor Relations , p. 451.
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The department which is closed temporarily for lack of work may
employ long service workers, while short service employees
remain in the operating; departments. Here the transfer from one
department to another becomes important if work of a similar
nature .is performed in a number of different departments. The
following is a clause from a contract between the Bell aircraft
Corporation and the United Automobile "Workers (CIO)
:
When An employee is laid off in one de
x
artment because of
lack of vork, and there is work ahead in another department,
such employee shall be transferred to the department having
work at the r«r te being paid for the work of which he is
capable in that department, in accordance with his jlant
seniority, and shall be given not to exceed three days in
which to demonstrate that he will be able and competent to
perform such work efficiently within a reasonable time. (20)
This is an evasive proviso, for three days is not a sufficient
length of time to demonstrate ability.
Under a straight departmental seniority, if the employee
requests the transfer, he usually does not take his seniority
credits to the new department, but he becomes a junior to those
employed at an earlier date in the new department^ even though
he may have more seniority credits accumul: ted from his former
job. If the management orders the transfer, the worker may
carry over his seniority to the ne ; department, in total, or at
least some part of it, such as fifty percent of it.
In the event of any department or job being transferred
from one part of the plant to another, the employees working
on the transferred job will be transferred with the job and
,
retain their seniority. (Packard Motor Car Company and Unitec
Automobile Torkers-CIO) (hi)
(20) Bureau of National Affairs. Collective Bargaining
Contracts, p. 490.
(21) Ibid., p. 502.

In such cases the employees of the new department will
object to longer service men entering their department because
of conflicting seniority rights. Sometimes when management
makes the transfers, the employee with the least seniority is
moved
.
It is important that management maintain flexibility
and eiasticicty in making interdepartmental transfers. Some-
times transfers from one department to another are necessary.
’There a transferred worker can transfer his seniority to a new
* *
department after a given period, such as two to twelve months,
interdepartmental transfers work fairly well. If layoff should
occur before the transferred employee has his permanent status
in the new department, his seniority is applied to the original
department. Since the employee retains his seniority in his
former department in the interim, he is rilling to be trans-
ferred and the junior men in the new department are not so re-
sentful. Difficult problems arise in the event of layoff in
the determination of the employee’s ability to perform the job
when returning to his former department or if the former job
has been eliminated
.
Management generally prefers to transfer workers to jobs
where they are experienced. The union insists on a trial
period with sufficient training. If the worker fails to qualify
he returns to his original job without losing his seniority.
’hen operations of existing plants are affected by the
..
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o ening of a new plant, the following clause provides that em-
ployees in the affected plants be transferred on the basis of
company-wide seniority and ability:
n
'hen a new plant is opened which replaces or curtails the
operations in another plant or plants, the employees in the
plants affected will be given preferential consideration for
transfer to the new plant on jobs for 'which they are quali-
fied from the standpoint of ability and length of service*-”*
Employees transferred will establish seniority on the basis
of their length of employment with the company. (Shell Oil
Company, Inc
. ,
and Oil -orkers International Union-CIO) (ah)
Conversion and war production changes provided an incen-
tive for transfers from plant to plant and from company to com-
pany. To stimulate movement to essential war work, the worker
who accepted, defense work with another concern accumulated
seniority in the original company where he 1 ould return in event
of layoff from the defense job. (Office of Production anagement
Regulation and War M anpower stabilization lan for the Detroit
(25)
Area) . In June 1942 the plan was amended to enable the workers
who trained for war jobs to keep their old jobs and accumulate
seniority there until January 1, 194.^, unless they were given
(24)
*
jobs of similar skill at their old plants. Under a
(22) Dureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
. p. 501.
(h5) Jonas Silver and Everett M. Kassalcw, "Seniority
in the Automobile Industry", monthly Labor Review. Vol. LIX,
No. 5, September, 1944, p. 465.
(24) Ibid., p. 490.
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provision of the Ford Motor Car Company and tne United automo-
bile -Yorkers (CIO) contract, the employee transferred to defense
work may upon completion of such work transfer b^ck to his form-
(25)
er job on the basis of seniority.
The transfer of work from one job to another is important
,
for it sometimes is a method of distributing the work force to
where it is most necessary. The change may increase the effi-
ciency of the worker which in the long run benefits the employ-
er. "Restlessness, instability, and inefficiency are evidences
that transfer should be effected, but care should be exercised
(26)
in making an adjustment between the worker and the new job".
This is not always complete evidence that a transfer is neces-
sary, for sometimes a transfer is not a cure for emotional un-
rest. Employees may desxre a transfer because of better oppor-
tunity for promotion and steadier employment.
Seniority is also applied to demotions, hours of work,
wage systems, and vacations. A "demotion is a shift to a posi-
(27)
tion where responsibilities are decreased". During periods of
layoff, the employees who are the least capable of performing
the work are the first to be demoted to an unskilled classifi-
cation. If the performance of work is relatively equal, the
I
employee with the least seniority is the first to be demoted.
”
"(25) Bureau of National affairs. Collective Bargaining
Contracts
. p. 501.
(26) Gordon S. Watkins, an Introduction to the Study of
Labor Problems
, p. 480.
(27) Dale Yoder, Personnel and Labor Relations, p.452.
Is
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Seniority shall govern, except in those c&ses vrnert. there
is sufficient difference in ability of two or more em] loyees
affected to outweigh the difference in seniority, (aluminum
Corporation of America and International Union Aluminum
"orkers of America, November, 1959) . (28)
Although supervisors are not always covered by seniority
in union contracts, the Regional Y7ar Labor Board of Detroit de-
cided in the Gear Grinding Machine Company that when employees
previously promoted to supervisory jobs because of the war ex-
pansion were laid off in a slack period, they were entitled to
reinstatement on hourly rate jobs on the basis of their accumu-
(£ 9 )
lated seniority. This seniority included service credits for
the time spent in the supervisory position. In a clause between
the Briggs Manufacturing Company and the United Automobile
Workers-CIO—"foremen demoted because of lack of work will not
be retained on the indispensable list for more than one yet
r
(50)
from date of demotion".
Under the following proviso the departmental chief
stewards will upon demotion maintain top seniority for one year
after demotion:
Departmental Chief Stewards, demoted because of lack of
work, ’.-ill retain their seniority status as chief stewards,
not to exceed one year from date of demotion. (Briggs Manu-
facturing Company and United Automobile "orkers-CIO) ( d 1
)
n(£8y
-
Tredericx H. Harbison, Seniority Policies and Pro-
cedures c-s ~evG lu r . eo Through Collective Bargaining
. x .
5
.
(£9) "Decisions on Seniority Rights", onthly Labor
Review .Vol. LX, No. 1, January, 1945, p. i£4.
(50) Bureau of National ; ff ; irs. Collective Darw. jninr
Contracts
. p . 504
.
P •(51) ibid., 50o.
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.
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Up to the time of the national wage stabilization program
imposed by wartime necessity, length of service in making wage
(£2 )
comparisons was seldom given any attention. The practice of
basing wage increases on merit has been displaced in many cases
by periodic automatic increases in pay. It is evident that mass
production industries require less skilled employees, because
the work is broken down into simple operations
.
Rewards for
that ty
;
e of work may be based on length of service to encour-
age the continuity of employment and to reduce the lc bor turn-
over. But it has al o be. n argued that a turnover problem is
involved, for if there is a lc.bor shortage "seniority rc.tes will
(S3)
not stop raids on ... personnel". But, if tnere is a 1 bor
shortage, the chance for "raids on personnel" would be smaller.
Since some employees may wish to transfer from the night
shift, if there are two shifts operating in a department, some
collective bargaining contracts grant preference in accordance
'ith seniority. Seniority is the governing rhetor in the choice
of shifts in the following clause: "Each man may choose the
shift he wishes to work and the day he wishes to be off, accord-
ing to his seniority". (Street and Electric Rail'. 'ay i mployees,
(-4 )
Pennsylvania)
.
Larue N. Train, "Length of Service and Wages",
'onthly Labor Review
,
Vol. XXIX, No. e, October, 1 ,20, p. 17.
(a5) Cameron McPherson, "Do Seniority Rulings Pay?"
rican
,
Vol
,
XI,
,
.
(a4) alec H. Mov/att, ."Seniority Provisions in Collective
", I
•
.. h Lc bor c . . jVII, o.
,
Dec
,
10a a, p. 1260 .
.
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Such a clause would result in the concentration of the older,
skilled employees on the day shift, with the young inexperienced
workers on the night, which may mean less efficient work on the
part of the latter group. Length of service should be considered
in making shift preferences, but not at the expense of efficiency
Those employees with the greatest length of service cre-
dits have preference in the distribution of overtime:
The distribution of overtime work shall be made so as not
to fall inequitably on any one or more employees. However,
men with greater seniority shall be given preference in the
distribution of this overtime work, if they can qualify by
experience and ability to do the work. In the event that
the average working d<=.y is less than eight hours, and during
such time or period there is an opportunity to perform oc-
casional extra hours of work, men with greater seniority
shall be given priority in the performance of this work,
(diamond T Motor Car Company and Automotive orkers Indus-
trial Union-Ind) (55)
The following clause, while it gives the senior employees the
first choice of overtime work, provides for the distribution of
unwanted work to those with the least seniority:
'.There the needs of the service require the working of
overtime, the Company shall make assignments of such over-
time in the order of greatest office seniority of employees
desiring such assignments in the classification involved;
and where no employees or an insufficient number of employee
s
in such classification accept such assignments, the Company
shall make such assignments among the employees in such
classifications in the order of least of: ice seniority.
(Postal Telegraph Company and American Communications Asso-
ciation-CIO) (06 )
Seniority may be the principle used for giving special
privileges to employees, such as the grant of traveling passes
(35) Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining
Contracts
. p. 415.
(06 ) Ibid., p. 415.
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so senior employees of a trt-.nsporto.tiun concern
,
a s coverec by
the agreement of the Ohio Greyhound Lines, Inc., and the Amal-
gamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Em-
ployees (AFL)
,
where a bus operator who has three years of
service receives annual passes in the region where he holes a
seniority. After five years he receives passes for all the line
(37)
of the company. Another special f. vor based on length of
service is the assignment of light work to long service employe
Employees who have given long and faithful s ervice in
the employ of the Company, and who have become un. ble to
handle heavy work to advantage, will be given preference to
such light work as they are able to perform. (Hubbard 1 Com-
pany and Steel Torkers Organizing Committee-CIO) (oh)
In general, employees are allowec- to choose their own
vacation period, but if the company feels that the work is
jeopardized, it reserves the privilege of selecting the vocation
period on the bc.sis of seniority.
Employees shall have first choice of vac:.- tion in the
order of their seniority upon written timely a. ..licatioi
,
when such choice of vacation period shall not seriously
interfere with the service of the employer. (Shadbolt and.
Boyd Company and Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Stablemen, and Helpers; Retail Clerks Protective associa-
tion; and Office Workers Union-AFL) (39)
(37) Bureau of 'ational Affairs, Collective Barn- in in r:
Contracts
, p . 506
.
(38) Ibid., p. 506.
(>9) Ibid., p. 580.
• •
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CHAPTER VI
AN EVALUATION OF SENIORITY
The fundamental purposes of a seniority system are to
gua rantee a measure of job security for middle ag ed and older
workers, and to remove the potential danger of favoritism and
discrimination exercised by management. So much nepotism and
bias had been demonstrated in arranging layoffs and job alloca-
tions that there was the necessity for some unprejudiced de-
( 1 )
termination, such as seniority. It was put into practice ”as a
defensive device during the period of insecure recognition of
U)
the union”. The demand for a rigid seniority system stems in
some measure from the union’s sense of weakness in its contracts
with management. The control of layoffs by seniority became an
issue of union organization, for it shielded the union members
from discrimination. Since the union was unable to exercise anj
degree of control over management’s decision of merit and effi-
ciency, it was only natural to try to check managerial control
by seniority. With the proper acknowledgment of union recogni-
tion, however, a union may be capable of better benefiting its
(1) Bureau of Labor Statistics, Division of Industrial
Relations, ’’Seniority Provisions ii Union Agreements”, ; Tonthly
Labor c.v.U
.
Voi. LII, No. 5, may, 1941, p. 1167
(2) Frederick H. Harbison, ’’Seniority in has s-Production
Industries”, Journal of Political FconomyVol. XLVIII, No. 6,
December, 1940, p. S61.
(F
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members by constructing an effective grievance machinery to con-)
trol favoritism and prejudice where they may be prevalent.
The seniority system tends to encourage the employees’
feeling of security which is reflected in their increased moral^
efficiency, and loyalty to their industrial concerns. Jobs are
more assured, as management must carefully consider employees ’
rights and must not make unreasonable discharges and haphazard
layoffs. The use of an objective rating plan may weed out less
(5 )
competent employees before they acquire seniority status, or
management must exercise greater care in the selection and
placement of its employees. Retention and promotion bc.sed on-
seniority encourages a faithful worker who would be in danger of
being eased out of his job by more exceptional but more unsteady
and less reliable workers.
v/ithin limitations many managements favor seniority, for
it promotes lifetime service. Often companies show their appre-
(4 )
ciation for long service by public recognition of some form.
Such qualities as dependability and persistence may be
effectively evaluated, and the long service required per-
mits workers to accumulate information with respect to the
business as a whole that may be desirable in some fields. ( 5 )
Seniority encourages workers to train for higher positions and
to learn as much as possible. A seniority system minimizes the
(o) Richard a. Lester, Economics of Labor
, p. 6L5.
(4) Conference Board Reports, ’’Recognizing Long Service”,
Personnel Series
.
No. 2d, p. 1.
(5) Dale Yoder, Personnel and Labor r.elations . p.S50.
. 2
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labor turnover by limiting the number of discharges and voluntar
resignations and thus assists management in eliminating an ele-
ment of cost. If a worker should quit his job, he may find it
quite dif icult to secure employment in another plant where the
workers have a .ell established seniority system. For he then
becomes a junior man and therefore subject to layoff ‘.'hen busi-
ness slackens.
But this loss of mobility is also a disadvantage, for it
interferes with the job opportunities of young men, while it
secures the position of long service workers by restricting
their movement. If a young man secures a position, h< will be
one of the first to be laid off when there is a lull in business
and the burden of job security falls on him. hen he should be
gaining a foothold in a job, he is changing from one to another,
for he does not remain in one position (through no fault of his
o r,n) long enough to acquire seniority credits. Such a loss of
mobility is disadvantageous to employees in industries which
experience seasonal fluctuations. Seniority becomes M a menace
to society in a situation which dooms men to drift from job to
job and into and out of employment until they have become middle
( 6 )
aged 11
.
,»•
Seniority does not remove unemployment resulting from
se sonal and cyclical fluctuations. Howeve:
,
a deg] se-
curity is securer, for most workers are assurer of employment
(6,) Edward t . Cowdrick, ’’The Riddle of aploye eniority
ation’s Business. Vol. XXVII. Fo
.
September, 13SS, p. ...
.
.'
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at the end of the period of layoff. And management is confident
that the majority of skilled workers will report for work when
business resumes full operation.
Often the employee with the longest seniority record does
not have the necessary essentials for promotions. If strict
seniority is practiced, many capable employees are compelled to
leave their jobs, because they refuse to wait for promotions by
slow stages. Seniority "overvalues, experience, so far as most
(7)
positions in modern industry are concerned',! The greatest skill
for many kinds of less important jobs is very likely learned in
a few years and the extra time on that job is for the most part
worthless. By exempting employees of unusual skill from the
seniority rule, incentive is not dampened and initiative is not
hampered. Many union leaders do not favor strict seniority as a
basis for promotion. They also consider other qualifications,
such as ability, efficiency, and training.
Seniority resists technological changes, because it in-
creases the number of displaced employees with less seniority by
(3)
long service workers. when old workers are uninterested in new
methods of production, such worx falls on the new employees. As
the new processes displace the old ones, the senior men claim
rights to displace the junior employees to remain employed
.
This causes much difficulty when the long service employees have
To
lotions, p.
(8 )
I' anagement
Dale Yoder
465
.
Sumner H.
.,
p. 154.
,
Personnel Management anc industrial Re -
Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial
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.
to spend a considerable length of time learning the new methods
and. when they are less efficient than the junior workers who hac
already mastered the new processes.
A seniority program makes men opposed to going on strike
(9)
against management. Alien employees have long ser vice recorcs
they are unwilling to strike. If the union loses the strike,
the strikebreakers hired to operate the plant will have more
seniority than the striker. For when the strikers are rehired
they will have the seniority status of new employees. Seniority
can also make the settlement of strikes more complex, for the
strikers will insist on maintaining their accumulated, seniority
credits. Many times the union and management may be in complete
agreement f.s to every other issue that caused the strike and be
deadlocked on the seniority issue. One of the issues holding
back the recent General Motors Corporation strike settlement was
that of seniority and ability as the basis for promotions. The
company wanted promotions based on merit and the union demanded
that seniority be given preference when other questions of abili-
( 10 )
ty are equal.
If strict seniority is too closely adhered to in layoffs,
the average age of employees in that industrial establishment
will increase because of the decreased turnover of long service
(9) Sumner H, Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial
Management
. p . 154
.
(10) Boston Herald . February 18, 1946.
r
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workers. "The demand for ne ' workers may be focused upon a
(11)
mobile reserve of younger men”. If management wants young men,
the older ’Yorkers .’ill demand retirement at an early age, and
management and labor are in harmony that Social Security Bene-
fits be lowered to sixty years of age, to afford the promotion
(12)
of the younger employees.
It is difficult to discover the actual ef ects of senior-
ity on efficiency, "unagement fears that the rising t verag^ are
of employees may impair efficiency, ns people do get ol'er they
may not be as efficient as younger persons. Edward L. Thorn-
(IS)
dike has stated that age decreased efficiency at the rate of
one to two per cent per annum bet’ een the ages of fifty anc.
seventy-five, especially on jobs of skill and energy" . On the
other hand, there is a large number of workers ./ho have developec
certain characteristics through the yeo.rs which they never had
in their youth, such as tact, sharp judgment, and keen per cep-
(14) (15)
’
tion. Frederics H. Harbison /rote in the American Economic
(11) Frederick K. Harbison, "Seniority in Mass-I roduction
Industries". Journal of Political Economy, Vol.XLVIII , • o. 6,
December, 1940, p. 858
(IE) Ibid., p. 853.
(la) Edward L. Thorndike. Human Mature and the. Social
Order, p. 55.
(14) Lillian Giibreth, "Hiring and Firing; Shall the Calen-
dar Measure Length of Service?" Factory and Industrial ^narerae/i 1
Vol.LXXIX, No. E, February", 1950, p. 510.
(15) Frederick H. Harbison, "Seniority Problems in Mass-
Production Industries; Round Table on Collective Bargaining and
Job Security”. American Economic Revie .Vol. 1 t,
March, 1940, p. Ee4.
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Review of March 1940 that the best degree of efficiency might be
continued if a small group of exeptional employees could be re-
tained or promoted without regard to seniority. Come seniority
systems which are sufficiently flexible do allow exceptional
workers to be excluded from the seniority rule sc that efficienc
is not impaired.
"There is no basic conflict between seniority and prod.uc-
(16)
tive efficiency". Management contends that productive effi-
ciency is reduced, because they have lost to a degree their powe ?
to promote, demote, transfer, and discharge its working forces
on the basis of ability. Since seniority takes the place of
prejudiced methods for making layoffs and promotions, efficiency
may be increased. If an employee is relieved of the fear of
losing his job, his efficiency and morale becomes greater. The
conflict that does exist is "between union security and effi-
( 17 )
ciency". The workers, on the whole, are reasonable men and
'"ill cooperate when they feel confident and secure in their re-
lationships with management.
If seniority provisions assure status of the employees a t
the expense of efficiency, they will retard progress aria
lower the standard, of living of all. If, however, they are
applied to a degree and in a manner which enhances both the
security and the efficiency of the '.’hole working population,
they are a. social invention of lasting importance. (italic;
not in the original) (18)
(16) Clinton Golden and Harold J.Ruttenberg, The Dynamics
of Industrial Democracy
.
p.l4<:.
(17) Ibid., p. 149.
(18) Frederick II. harbison. Seniority Policies and Prac -
tices as Developed Through Collective Bargaining
, p. iv.
'.
'
.
.
.
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Management officials who are in close contact with the em-
(19)
ployees are inclined to favor a seniority program. They are
aware that if layoffs and promotions were based solely on merit,
they would constantly be charged with discrimination and favorit-
ism. To the extent that administration costs are low, despite
the number of transfers to fill vacancies, and that the employee:
on the whole, are satisfied with seniority, the program is an
advantage to management. If a worker is displeased with some
rule of the seniority system that may affect him unfavorably, he
can persuade his co-workers of its injustice and so may be in a
position to have the rule altered. But a seniority program does
prevent management from keeping a proper age apportionment and
from checking the deterioration of work practices which often
exists from those being in one position for a long period of
time.
The main importance of seniority clauses in collective
bargaining contracts is that for the worker they represent to a
greater extent a measure of increased job security as his length
of service increases. xt is the workers’ viewpoint that the man
longest in the service should not be laid off to make room for a
beginner who happens to have influence with the 'employer
.
The
middle aged and the older employees who are in constant fear
that their jobs will be taken from them by younger men, maintain
that the junior employees be the first to be laic off in a
(19) Dan H. Mater, ’’Effects of Seniority upon the elfare
of the employee, the Employer, and Society”, Journal of Business
of the University of Chicago
.
Vol.XIV, Ho.4, October, 1941, p.o98.
. (
« !
.
.
!
•
*
.
/
r
.82.
depression. It is this latter group who will suffer most from
periods of depressions.
Seniority is an inducement to continue working in that
specific company, and thereby their loyalty and dependability
are increased. But it can also be argued that seniority limits
the scope of a worker by binding him to one establishment, and
is a definite hindrance if he desires employment else here in a
job to which he is better adapted and if he has an opportunity
to make a better livelihood. It is frequently argued also that
merit would be a better me-, surement for the relationship between
labor and management if mass production and mass employment were
not as enormous as it is today.
"Seniority is almost as contentious a subject in unionism
(20 )
as it is in collective bargaining". There is a constant con-
%
flict bet ;een senior and junior employees. The senior workers
desire strict application of seniority which is violently opposec
by men with less seniority who demand a more flexible seniority
program. Seniority rights may grant the long service workers
greater job security if they may have the good fortune to be
employed in a seniority district where employment is relatively
r «
steady. The junior men may try to prevent the senior employees
from entering their department to displace them. This divergent
of interests of workers with short and. long service credits,
whereby 'workers try to protect their individual rights rather
than have the union protect them, may destroy unity within the
(SO) S. T. Villiamson and Herbert Harris, Trends ir. Col-
lective Ba
r
r aining
. p. 101.
(f
.
.
i
.
.
.
local union. "Seniority Cc.n become a disruptive force in an in-
dustrial union which may undermine the unity and solidarity of
(21 )
the organizations".
Displacement of one employee by another through seniority,
not only causes conflicts between the senior and junior employees
in the same union, but on the railroad, it results in the clash
(22)
of interests between the different unions. hen layoffs occur,
an engineer may displace a fireman who has been promoted from
the firebox to an engine throttle, and a conductor may bump a
trainman. This causes a dislocation of seniority and results in
ill feeling between the engineer’s and fireman’s union brother-
hoods and between the conductor’s and trainman’s brotherhoods
.
It is quite feasible that stringent seniority rules may
become more flexible when collective bargaining contracts be-
come a process of administration through joint discussion and
negotiation and not a set of defense clauses rotecting manage-
(21 )
ment’s ana union’s interests. In addition to a regular griev-
ance committee, a few companies have set up special committees
of management and union representatives to administer the senior-
(24)
ity programs. Layoffs, transfers, and promotions are
(2l) Frederica H. Harbison, "Seniority in Mass -Production
Industries", Journal of Politic.- 1 Iconomy
.
Vo I. XLVIII, No. 6,
December, 1340, p. 861.
(2a) S. T. 1 "illiamson and Herbert Harris, Trends in
Collective Bargaining
, p . 102
.
(2a) Frederic : H. Harbison, Seniority Policies an:" Pro -
cedures as Developed Through Collective Bargaining 1
, p. 51.
(24) Ibid., p. 49.
A.
discussed, and the committee’s decisions are binding on both
parties, management prepares the proposed layoff list by occu-
pations indicating the employees’ length of service credits anci
ability as decided by management’s ability rating plan. The
union sometimes confirms the total list or disagrees with a
part of it, in which c..ses the disagreements arc discussed" by
the seniority committee. The same procedure is carried through
in the determination of promotions.
Seniority may be modified to a great extent if unions are
acce ted more completely, especially if they participate with
management in some of the responsibilities for determining skill
and ability, "'hen management will discuss reductions of the
working forces and promotions vith the union there ill be less
of a tendency on the union’s part to demand a rigid seniority
system. Apprehension toward a merit system 'ill no longer
prevail, if union officials are consulted on decisions of merit.
"Constructive and cooperative union-management relations c.re
(25)
essential"
.
post war periods bring forth many changes, and especially
numerous are those in the labor movement. Many actions of labor
and management are in the process of being decided, and once the
decisions are announced, repercussions from both parties are bou
to occur, the results of which cannot be predicted at this writi
(^5) Frederick H. Harbison, "Seniority in Mass-Production
Industries", Journal of Political Economy . Vol. XLVIII, No. 0
,
December, 1340, p. 16b.
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The problem of seniority is an issue which is becoming
more and. more significant in labor and management relations as a
result of mass production, mass employment and expanding union
activities. Industry had been emphasizing the speed and forti-
tude of youth, and had been discharging so many older workers
that the unions demanded the inclusion of a seniority system in
the collective bargaining contracts to protect older men.
Seniority rules are intended to grant to long service employees
job security and to remove the potential danger of favoritism an 5.
discrimination from being exercised by management. Unskilled
and semi-skilled workers are especially motivated, toward job
security by the fear of layoff, for they want assurance that
they ’Till be able to maintain their prevailing standard of
living. The desire for economic security is vitc.l today,
because the average worker has no control over his job. He
joins a union, which can secure for him what he as an individual
cannot attain. By doing so, collective bargaining has been
some 'hat successful in procuring for the worker the security he
lost as a result of technological achievements of industrializa-
tion. Seniority clauses represent to a great extent a degree of
job security as the workers' length of service increases. The
middle aged and older employees, who are constantly afraid that
they will be displaced by younger workers, claim that junior men
be the first to be laid off. That means that the older workers
experience the job security, while the young men bec.r the
burden of unemployment
.
..
.
.
.
t
By assuring the workers of jobs on the basis ol seniority
productive efficiency may possibly be reduce-:
.
It may stifle
the ambition of competent young men, for they will be the first
to be laid off when ’ ork slackens. Seniority also restricts job
opportunities for men just entering the labor force. However,
seniority removes fear and apprehension from the •orkers 1 minds,
which makes for increased morale, loyalty, and efficiency. It
is only human for workers to try to acquire the protection which
seniority grants them.
One of the many problems confronting us in the post war
period is the pronounced fear of insecurity caused by the re-
turning servicemen. The veteran must be absorbed in industry.
The non-veteran is fearful of his job, for the veteran has a new
type of absolute preference in employment known as supersenior-
ity. He counts the time spent in the Armed Forces as the time
worked for his former employer and he can displace workers re-
gardless of their seniority. ’I&nagement is also concerned about
superseniority, for reconversion may be impeded by the inexperi-
enced veterans. The union is not well-disposed toward super-
seniority, for it is obligated to safeguard the rights of its
members, and yet it cannot create anti-union feeling among the
veterans. The union would guarantee the veterans their old jobs
in accordance ^ith the seniority clauses in collective bargain-
ing contracts. Relations between the veteran and the union are
approaching a crucial point and even the courts are not in agree
rnent on numerous decisions.
.•
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Seniority as applied to layoff and rehiring is rei.L
established in American industry. Layoff is used most frequently
in connection with dismissal from t- job because of lack of v;ork.'
The principle of seniority considers that trie v/orker with the
longest service record who is competent to perform the work be
retained during a reduction of the working forces. The workers
with the least seniority are among the first to be laid off.
Strict seniority rules are often influenced by ability, effi-
ciency, age, and family status. Often seniority is also modi-
fied by exempting employees of a specialized skill who are
usually t certain percentage of the working staff. Shop steward;
are often exempted to maintain the continuity of the bargaining
process
.
There is wide variation in collective bargaining
agreements as to the termination, accumulation, or retention of
seniority during layoff periods. Often one or t :'o years is the
maximum period during which an employee retains his seniority
standing, although shorter and longer periods of time are also
found in contracts. Unions are fearful that if seniority is
lost during layoff, workers can obtain employment only in com-
petition with new- employees, and that the employer may dis-
criminate against union members and ol< workers when rehiring.
The employees with the greatest service credits among
those laid off are the' first ones to be reemployec
.
The same
qualifications of ability and efficiency which governed layoff
influence recall.
Because displays of favoritism and charges of some
—
.
.•
^
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discrimination against union members are frequent grievances,
unions are insistent that seniority be the basis for promotion.
Most collective bargaining contracts contain clauses that the
senior employee will be promoted if he demonstrates sufficient
ability in a trial period for the advanced position. Sometimes
seniority determines the preference if ability and efficiency
are equal. Management feels that making promotions is its pre-
rogative. The union is generally dissatisfied if management de-
termines ability, for it regards management’s decision as favor-
itism. If management overlooks seniority, the workers feel a
strong sense of injustice when new employees are advanced out o
f
turn. This results in reduced efficiency. Strict adherence to
seniority as applied to promotions causes junior employees to
seek employment elsewhere, for ambitious young men refuse to
wait for promotions by slow stages. Seniority must be recognize
to assure workers freedom from discrimination and favoritism.
One of the problems in the application of a seniority
program is the determination of a seniority unit, department,
plant, or a combination of the two. in industrial establish-
ments where there is a great variety of operations, the firm is
composed of departments, so that ohly the workers performing
the same type of work are in competition when positions are
filled and advancements made. Often long service workers are
laid off in the departments in which work is curtailed
,
while
short service men are retained in the operating ones. In such
instances senior employees are sometimes permitted to displace
junior workers only in the departments in which they have once
d
/.
.
. ;i ' i
.
•
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rked. Departmental seniority limits the application of
seniority to a designated department, for the employees with the
least seniority are the first ones to be laid off without regard
for their jobs.
Unions are in favor of plant-wide seniority, for it allow
the greatest protection to long service workers. Preference in
layoff and recall is based on total seniority credits regardless
of the department which is being curtailed. This me^ns that one
layoff results in numerous displacements, causing much dissatis-
faction among the workers end management.
Unions and management have agreed on many plans 7/hereby
departmental and plant-wide seniority are combined. Employees
may be promoted and transferred in accordance ith departmental
seniority, and long service workers are laid off on the b^sis of
their plant seniority. Or employees may be laic off according
to departmental seniority and rehired on plant seniority. There
are many combinations which should be able to meet the require-
ments of management and the corkers.
With reservation many employers favor seniority, for it
encourages lifetime service. It reduces the labor turnover by
limiting the number of discharges and resignations. ' orkers
may experience difficulty in remaining employed in another plant
with a 'ell established seniority program, for they are subject
to layoff when business slackens. This loss of mobility is alsc
a hindrance to the workers if they are better adapted to work
elsewhere. Seniority resists technological changes, because it
..
.
.
service byincreases the number of displaced employees with less
longer service employees. It makes men opposed to strikes,
while it makes the settlement of strikes more complicatec
.
Strict adherence to a seniority program increases the average
age of workers, because of the decreased turnover. Management
is fearful that this rising age may impair efficiency. On the
other hand a large number of workers have developed certain
traits which they never had in their youth. Under other cir-
cumstances or in previous periods "'hen mass production and mass
employment were not as important as it is now, merit would be
or was a better measurement for relationship between management
a nd the unions. Seniority is not the perfect solution, but it
is the best suggestion thus far in assuring the -'orkers job
security. A strict seniority system may become more flexible
when collective bargaining becomes a process of administration
through joint discussion and negotiation. Apprehension toward
a merit system will no longer exist if unions are accepted more
readily and if they participate with management in determining
skill and ability.
The labor movement is constantly expanding, especially
so after wars. Many decisions concerning seniority in labor
and management relations may be altered, the results of which
cannot be prophesied at this time.
. 1
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